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a b s t r a c t
This paper provides a sound and complete proof system for a language Le+Y that adds to
Dynamic Epistemic Logic (DEL) a discrete previous-time operator as well as single symbol
formulas that partially reveal the most recent event that occurred. The completeness
theorem is by filtration followed by model unraveling and other model transformations.
Decidability follows from the completeness proof. The degree to which it is important
to include the additional single symbol formulas is addressed in a discussion about the
difficulties of the completeness for a language LY that only adds the previous-time
operator to DEL. Discussion is also given regarding the completeness for a language
obtained by removing common knowledge operators fromLe+Y .
© 2010 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Epistemic logic describes the knowledge and belief of agents. Adding to this an ability to describe changes in the
knowledge and belief has been receiving an increasing amount of attention. Such logics can contribute to a number of
fields such as artificial intelligence and computer security. One general approach to describing changes in beliefs has been
to describe changes in knowledge and belief over time using Epistemic Temporal Logics (ETL) [10,7,8,13]. Another general
approach, calledDynamic Epistemic Logic (DEL) [2,3,14,11,9], describes changes as a result of events that involve information
being revealed to the agents in a variety of ways such as through a public or a private announcement. While ETL can express
beliefs of agents in both the past and future, the causes of the belief change are given little structure. Dynamic Epistemic
Logic, however, provides internal structure to the causes of the belief change, typically using relational structures called
event models, and has a sophisticated method of determining new beliefs from old through such events. But DEL has very
limited flexibility with regard to describing beliefs through time, and cannot reflect the past at all.
Adding temporal operators to DEL has been receiving recent attention. The paper [16] introduces a number of languages
that add both past and future temporal components to DEL, and gives examples of where these languages can be used. The
paper [1] focuses on the involvement of future operators, and both [12,15] have involved discrete previous-time operators.
The papers [12,15,16] involve the addition of previous-time operators to variations of DEL.
This paper focuses on the proof of soundness, completeness, and decidability of a language that adds a discrete previous-
time operator to DEL. As is discussed in [16], adding a previous-time operator to DEL allows us not only to express what
happened in the past, but also the effect of agents being informed about past situations. Using a previous-time operator,
we can also express in the logic when an agent’s beliefs changed or how long it has been since something was true. In this
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paper, time is structured similarly to the natural numbers, with a least point representing the earliest stage of time andwith
discrete increments. The previous-time operator also allows us to express what time it is with respect to this beginning.
Both [12,15] include proof systems involving previous-time operators that are shown to be both sound and completewith
respect to semantics that have differences from the one used in this paper. The language given in [12] includes previous-time
operators parametrized by full events but has no common knowledge operator, whereas this paper focuses on a language
Le+Y that has partial events as atomic formulas and a commonknowledge operator. The completeness proof for the language
given in [12] uses amethod that builds on a completeness proof in [5] for dynamic epistemic logic constrained by a protocol.
The techniques for completeness used in this paper differ from those in [12], building on the language-reduction technique
of [3,9], while also employing a novel mix of model translations. Furthermore, this paper also investigates completeness for
a languageLY with a single (un-parametrized) previous-time operator without the company of formulas for partial events,
and reveals the important role of the partial events in the completeness proof.
The paper [15] involves an un-parametrized previous-time operatorwithout the company of partial events, and also does
not include common knowledge. Although [15] places some emphasis on showing how temporal restrictions can be placed
in a coherent way on the models so that they are for example ordered and non-past branching, completeness in [15] is only
proved with respect to a minimally restricted class of models that do not enforce restrictions on the temporal component.
This paper, on the other hand, proves completeness for structures that are guaranteed to have structural properties given by a
sequence of epistemicmodels, with eachmodel following the previous one according to the updating procedure used in DEL.
The primary structures used in this paper are sequences of epistemic models, which we call sequential histories.
Completeness is proved by finding a model for a consistent formula, and to make it easier to represent all of the previous
models, we involve for the purpose of proving completeness, a single model with a previous-time relation and suitable
semantics for such amodel. In this paper,we call suchmodelswith a previous-time relation epistemic temporalmodels (ETM),
andwe call them epistemic temporal histories (ETH) when they obey certain structural properties, many of which correspond
to ones identified in the merging frameworks papers [5,6]. This paper then shows that every epistemic temporal history is
isomorphic to some sequential history. This is similar to the developments in [15], in which an isomorphism is established
between sequential histories and epistemic temporal models generated from an epistemic model by repeated applications
of updates that are particular to that paper; however the isomorphism from [15] is not used for completeness. In addition to
helping prove completeness, the isomorphism in this paper helps solidify the connection between the merging frameworks
properties and the updates in [15].
A filtration method is used to find a finite ETM for a given consistent formula, though this ETM need not satisfy all the
constraints needed to be an ETH. Thus a number of model transformations are performed. The first of these transformations
is an unraveling of the model into a tree-like structure. A complete unraveling often results in an infinite model, though to
establish decidability, we only unravel in the temporal direction, which can safely be trimmed to ensure the resultingmodel
is finite. The remaining transformations involve the removal of some states and the addition of some relational connections.
The truth of all formulas is not preserved through some of these transformations, but the truth of the original consistent
formula will be preserved at some state, thus maintaining its satisfiability.
The organization of this paper is as follows. The next section (Section 2) describes the structures involved in DEL, and
introduces the structures, called sequential histories, onwhich the semantics of the languages of this paper are defined. Three
languages are then introduced,LY ,LYe , andLe+Y . The languageLY simply adds to DEL a previous-time operator that does
not depend on previous events. The language LYe replaces the unconditional previous-time operator of LY with previous-
time operators that depend on some aspect of the most recent event. The languageLe+Y adds toLY single symbol formulas
thatmake assertions about some aspect of themost recent event. The languagesLYe andLe+Y are equally expressive, andwe
choose to useLe+Y for the proof systemand completeness theorem. Section 3 introduces a proof system forLe+Y . Soundness
is proved and useful provable extensions of the axioms are also given. Section 4 introduces ETMs and ETHs, which are easier
to construct using a filtration than the sequential histories typically used. But the semantics of some components of the
language are more difficult to define on ETMs, and hence a function is defined to translate any formula into an equivalent
one for which such semantics are easier to define, using a variation of the reduction technique of both [3,9]. An isomorphism
theorem showing that at ETH corresponds to a sequential history is also given. Section 5 proves completeness forLe+Y , by
first defining a filtration. The filtration is a finite epistemic temporalmodel that need not have all the properties needed for it
to correspond to a sequential history. A number of model transformations are performed to establish the desired properties.
Section 6 discusses how the completeness proof for Le+Y can be modified for languages that have common knowledge
operators, and then discusses to what extent the completeness proof could be used for the languageLY .
2. Structures
We generally use the symbol A for a finite set of agents andΦ for a set of atomic propositions.
2.1. Models and update product
Definition 2.1 (State Model). Given a set A of agents and a set Φ of atomic propositions, define a state model to be a tuple
S = (S,→S, ‖ · ‖S), where
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1. S is a set,
2. →S : A→ S × S is a function that assigns a binary relation A−→S over S for every agent A ∈ A,
3. ‖ · ‖S is a function mapping each proposition letter inΦ to a subset of S.
Notation 2.2. We typically drop the subscript S from the components of a state model when the model is understood from
context.
We call each element of S a state. The set S is called the carrier set of the model S. Define a function car that maps a state
model to its carrier set. For each A ∈ A, the relation A−→ is written in infix, where s A−→ t can be read as ‘‘in state s, A considers
t possible’’. We call a relation with this reading an epistemic relation. The function ‖ · ‖S is called a valuation function. We can
think of the atomic propositions inΦ as being properties the valuation function assigns to the states.
A pair (S, s) consisting of a state model S and a state s ∈ car(S) is called a pointed state model. Call a sequence
H = (S1, . . . , Sn) of state models a state model sequence. We will later define a history to be a state model sequence that
satisfies certain conditions, which is why we choose the letter H . We can think of the state models as representing a certain
stage in time, with S1 being the oldest and Sn being themost recent. Define a functionmdl that takes a statemodel sequence
(S1, . . . , Sn) and returns the model Sn. A pair (H, s)where s ∈ car(mdl(H)) is called a pointed sequence.
Definition 2.3 (Splitting Function). A function that given any state model sequence H returns a subset of car(mdl(H)) is
called a splitting function. LetS be the set of all splitting functions.
We next define an event model, for which its primary difference from a state model is that the valuation function is
replaced by a different function pre called a precondition function.
Definition 2.4 (Event Model). Given a set A of agents, define an event model to be a tuple E = (E,→E , preE ), where
1. E = {e1, . . . , en} is a finite set, with a fixed enumeration,
2. →E : A→ E × E is a function assigning a binary relation A−→E to every agent A ∈ A,
3. preE : E → S is a function assigning a splitting function to every e ∈ E.
Notation 2.5. We typically drop the subscript E from the components of an event model when the model is understood
from context.
Each element of E is called an event point. We can apply the function car to event models as well as state models so that
given an event model E = (E,→, pre), car(E) = E. A pair (E, e) where e ∈ car(E) is called a pointed event model. For each
A ∈ A, the relation A−→E is written in infix, where e A−→E f can be read as ‘‘A considers f a possible occurrence if e actually
happens’’. Due to the reading of this relation, we also call it an epistemic relation.
Notation 2.6. Given a state model (S,→S, ‖ · ‖S) or an event model (E,→E , ‖ · ‖E ), if B ⊆ A is a set of agents, we may
write
B−→S for⋃{ A−→S : A ∈ B} and similarly B−→E for⋃{ A−→E : A ∈ B}. Subscripts may be dropped if the model is understood
from context.
For any relation in this paper, we define the following.
Definition 2.7 (Iterated Relations and Reflexive Transitive Closure). For a relation R over a set X , we define R0 = {(x, x) :
x ∈ X} to be the smallest reflexive relation over A. For each n ≥ 0 the iterated relation Rn+1 = RRn, where RRn = {(x, z) :
there exists y such that xRy and yRnz} represents the usual composition of the relation Rwith Rn. We also define the reflexive
transitive closure R∗ of R to be R∗ =⋃∞n=0 Rn.
Definition 2.8 (Update Product). Given a state model sequence H = (S1, . . . , Sn), where Sn = (Sn,→n, ‖ · ‖n) and
given an event model E = (E,→E , ‖ · · · ‖E ), the update product of H and E , written H ⊗ E , is (S1, . . . , Sn), where
Sn+1 = (Sn+1,→n+1, ‖ · ‖n+1) and
1. Sn+1 = {(s, e) ∈ Sn × E : s ∈ pre(e)(Sn)},
2. (s, e)
A−→n+1 (t, f ) iff both s A−→n t and e A−→E f (Note that (s, e), (t, f ) ∈ Sn+1),
3. ‖p‖n+1 = {(s, e) ∈ Sn+1 : s ∈ ‖p‖n}.
Definition 2.9 (Sequential History). A state model sequenceH = (S0, S1, . . . , Sn) is called a sequential history if there is a
sequence of event models E1, . . . , En, such thatH = (S0)⊗ E1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ En.
We will typically call a sequential history a ‘‘history", as it will be clear what is meant until we define another structure
called an ‘‘epistemic temporal history" later in this paper.
Notation 2.10. Wemay write s ∈ H in place of s ∈ car(mdl(H)).
We next define more functions on histories.
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Definition 2.11 (Functions prvh, prvs, and evnt). We define function prvh (short for previous history) as follows: If H =
(S1, . . . , Sn, Sn+1) is a history, then prvh(H) = (S1, . . . , Sn). If H = (S) is a history with only one state model, then
prvh(H) = ∅. Finally, we define the function prvh on the empty-set: prvh(∅) = ∅.
We define functions prvs (short for previous state) and evnt (short for event point) as extensions of projection functions
pi1 and pi2, which take a pair as input and return respectively the first and second coordinates of the input. If s = (s′, e), then
prvs(s) = s′ and evnt(s) = e. If s 6= (s′, e) for any s′ or e, then prvs(s) = evnt(s) = ∅.
These functions are defined to be total functions on the set of histories or the set of states, which is why they are defined for
initial histories and states. We define prvh on ∅, so that it can be an operator, that is so that its domain and range can be the
same. This may be useful when we iterate the functions prvh and prvs. Let prvhn+1(H) = prvh(prvhn(H)), and similarly for
prvs. Defining prvh on ∅ allows us to apply prvh to itself arbitrarily many times. We know that prvhn(H) is defined, even if
we do not know whether n is greater than the length of H .
2.2. Event frame
In modal logic, the underlying relational structure of a model is called a frame, that is, the model is the frame plus the
valuation function. Here, we define an event frame such that an event model is just the event frame plus a precondition
function.
Definition 2.12 (Event Frame). Given a set A of agents, define an event frame to be a tuple F = (E,→F ), where
1. E = {e1, . . . , en} is a finite set, with a fixed enumeration.
2. →F : A→ E × E is a function assigning a binary relation A−→F to every agent A ∈ A.
Some treatments of Dynamic Epistemic Logic (DEL), such as [2], fix an event frame for a particular language. The name
signature is sometimes used instead of the frame in order to suggest that a language depends on it.
The idea behind fixing an event frame is that in order to specify a pointed event model in a formula of the language,
the formula need only capture the precondition function and a particular event point. The precondition function can be
expressed using a sequence of formulas, one for every event point, and via the semantics, each formula characterizes a
splitting function. As infinitely many splitting functions can be characterized using a finite alphabet of symbols, infinitely
many event models can be captured using a finite alphabet of symbols. For this paper, the use of an event frame will be
useful in establishing completeness.
With a fixed event frame, event models can be characterized by the precondition function alone.
Notation 2.13. If F = (E,→), where E has n event points, then given a list Eς = (ς1, . . . , ςn) of splitting functions, we can
define a precondition function pre such that pre(ei) = ςi. In this way, a list of splitting functions characterizes a precondition
function, which together with the event frame F characterizes an event model. We may write H ⊗ Eς in place of H ⊗ E ,
where E is the event model characterized by the list Eς of splitting functions.
2.3. Language
The languages defined here depend on an event frameF and a setΦ of atomic propositions. In this sectionwewill define
three languages LY (F ,Φ), Le+Y (F ,Φ) and LYe(F ,Φ). When F and Φ are understood from context, we will drop them
from the notation. The languageLY extends the Dynamic Epistemic Logic (DEL) in [2] with a single previous-time operator
Y¯ . The language Le+Y adds to LY formulas that express the action point of the most recent action. The language LYe adds
to DEL a previous-time operator Ye that depends on the action point of the most recent action. We will see that there is a
natural translation between Le+Y and LYe , indicating that they are equivalent languages. The language LYe will play little
role outside this section, but it is defined here, for some readers may find it easier to relate to other languages they know.
Later in this paper, it will beLe+Y for which we present a complete proof system,
Definition 2.14 (LanguageLe+Y ,LY , andLYe ). Let Φ be a set of atomic propositions, and let F = (E,→) be an event
frame, where E consists of n event points. The formulas ofLe+Y (F ,Φ) are given by the following Bachus–Naur form:
ϕ ::= true | p | e | ¬ϕ |ϕ ∧ ψ |Aϕ |∗Bϕ | [ψ1, . . . , ψn, e]ϕ | Y¯ϕ
where p ∈ Φ is an atomic proposition, e ∈ E is an event point, A ∈ A is an agent, B ⊆ A is a set of agents, and ϕ, ψ ,
ψ1, . . . , ψn are formulas.
We obtain the languageLY (F ,Φ) fromLe+Y (F ,Φ) by removing the formula e from the Bachus–Naur form.We obtain
the languageLYe(F ,Φ) fromLY (F ,Φ) by adding to the Bachus–Naur form formulas of the form Yeϕ.
Note that although formulas e are eliminated fromLY , formulas [ψ1, . . . , ψn, e]ϕ remain in the language. Thus the change
is that e can no longer be a formula by itself.
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Definition 2.15 (Abbreviations). We adopt the following abbreviations: false ≡ ¬ true, [ Eψe] ≡ [ψ1, . . . , ψn, e], ϕ ∨ ψ ≡
¬(¬ϕ ∧ ¬ψ), ϕ → ψ ≡ ϕ ∧ ¬ψ , and ϕ ↔ ψ ≡ (ϕ → ψ) ∧ (ψ → ϕ). For each modality , we define 0ϕ ≡ ϕ
and for n ≥ 0, n+1ϕ ≡ nϕ. We also define 〈 Eψe〉ϕ ≡ ¬[ Eψe]¬ϕ, ♦Aϕ ≡ ¬A¬ϕ, ♦∗Bϕ ≡ ¬∗B¬ϕ, Ŷϕ ≡ ¬Y¯¬ϕ, and
Ŷeϕ ≡ ¬Y¯e¬ϕ.
Formulas true, p,¬ϕ, andϕ∧ψ have their usual propositionalmeaning, and are given a formal semantics below. Formulas
of the form e, where e ∈ E, imply that the current history is not an initial history, and that the current history was created
using a pointed event model, whose point is e. The symbols Y¯ , Y¯e, [ Eψe],A, and ∗B are calledmodal operators ormodalities;
these names will also apply to non-primitive symbols Ŷ , Ŷe, 〈 Eψe〉, ♦A, and ♦∗B. Formulas of the form Y¯ϕ will be read as ‘‘if
therewere a previous stage, thenϕwould have been true then’’. Formulas of the form Y¯eϕ (which only appear in the language
LYe ) will be read as ‘‘if there were a previous stage in which e were the point of the pointed model generating the current
history, then ϕ was true at that previous stage’’. Formulas of the form Aϕ can be read as ‘‘A believes that ϕ’’. Formulas of
the form∗Bϕ can be read as ‘‘It is common belief among the agents of B that ϕ’’. Formulas of the form [ Eψe]ϕ are called event
modalities, and they are read as ‘‘ϕ is true after any possible event characterized by [ Eψe]’’. What is meant by ‘‘possible’’ and
‘‘characterized by [ Eψe]’’ should become clear from the formal definition of the semantics below. The semantics is defined by
a function [[·]] from formulas to splitting functions. The splitting function tells us for what states in each model the formula
is true. As we have a fixed event frame, we make use of Notation 2.13 for the update product.
Definition 2.16 (Semantics). The semantics for LYe , Le+Y and LY is defined inductively by a function [[·]] that takes a
formula and returns a splitting function. The splitting function will take as input a history and then output the states in
the most recent model of the history for which the formula is true. Let E[[ψ]] = [[ψ1]], . . . , [[ψn]].
s ∈ [[ true]](H) iff s ∈ H
s ∈ [[p]](H) iff s ∈ ‖p‖mdl(H)
s ∈ [[e]](H) iff evnt(s) = e, prvh(H) 6= ∅, and s ∈ H
s ∈ [[¬ϕ]](H) iff s ∈ [[ true]](H)− [[ϕ]](H)
s ∈ [[ϕ ∧ ψ]](H) iff s ∈ [[ϕ]](H) ∩ [[ψ]](H)
s ∈ [[Aϕ]](H) iff t ∈ [[ϕ]](H)whenever s A−→mdl(H) t
s ∈ [[∗Bϕ]](H) iff t ∈ [[ϕ]](H)whenever s B−→
∗
mdl(H) t
s ∈ [[[ Eψe]ϕ]](H) iff (s, e) ∈ [[ϕ]](H ⊗ E[[ψ]])whenever (s, e) ∈ H ⊗ E[[ψ]]
s ∈ [[Y¯ϕ]](H) iff prvs(s) ∈ [[ϕ]](prvh(H))whenever prvh(H) 6= ∅
s ∈ [[Y¯eϕ]](H) iff prvs(s) ∈ [[ϕ]](prvh(H))whenever prvh(H) 6= ∅ and evnt(s) = e.
We can translateLYe intoLe+Y by translating Yeϕ into e→ Yϕ. We can also translateLe+Y intoLYe by translating e into¬Ye¬ true and Yϕ into∧{Yeϕ : e ∈ E}.
The primary completeness result of this paper is forLe+Y with respect to the class of characterizable sequential histories:
Definition 2.17 (Characterizable Sequential History). Given a languageLe+Y (F ,Φ), a sequential historyH = (S1, . . . , Sn)
is characterizable, letHk = (S1, . . . , Sk) for each k ≤ n. Then for each k < n, there are formulas Eψ (depending on k) such
thatHk+1 = Hk ⊗ Eψ .
3. Proof system
We present a proof system forLe+Y . Recall that the symbols→, Ŷ , and false are not primitive symbols, and hence most
of the formulas listed below are abbreviations for the actual axioms.
3.1. Axioms and rules
We first present a set of axioms not involving knowledge.
[ Eχe](ϕ→ ψ)→ ([ Eχe]ϕ→ [Eχe]ψ) [ Eχe]-normality
Y¯ (ϕ→ ψ)→ (Y¯ϕ→ Y¯ψ) Y¯ -normality
[ Eψei]p↔ (ψi → p) future atomic permanence
Y¯ p↔ (̂Y true→ p) past atomic permanence
[ Eψei]¬ϕ ↔ (ψi → ¬[ Eψei]ϕ) event model partial functionality
Y¯¬ϕ ↔ (̂Y true→ ¬Y¯ϕ) non-branching past
[ Eψei]Y¯ϕ ↔ (ψi → ϕ) future past mix
[ Eψe]e future event point mix
Ŷ true↔∨{e : e ∈ E} past and event point mix
e→ ¬f for each e 6= f uniqueness of event points
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The next set of axioms involves belief, and some are expressed with conjunctions over a set of formulas. In the case that a
conjunction (as in the epistemic future axiom) turns out to be over ∅ (that is, it has no conjuncts), replace it with the formula
true.
A(ϕ→ ψ)→ (Aϕ→ Aψ) A-normality
∗B(ϕ→ ψ)→ (∗Bϕ→ ∗Bψ) ∗B-normality
∗B(ϕ→
∧{Aϕ : A ∈ B})→ (ϕ→ ∗Bϕ) induction
∗Bϕ→ ϕ ∧
∧{A∗Bϕ : A ∈ B} epistemic mix
[ Eψei]Aϕ ↔ (ψi →∧{A[ Eψej]ϕ : ei A−→ ej}) epistemic future mix
Y¯Aϕ→ AY¯ϕ epistemic past mix
Ŷ true→ AŶ true non-initial-time
Y¯ false→ AY¯ false initial-time
e→ A¬f (where¬(e A−→ f )) restriction
For the rules, we use the symbol ` in front of a formula that is provable. We have the following standard model logic rules:
From ` ϕ and ` ϕ→ ψ , infer ` ψ modus ponens
From ` ϕ, infer ` [ Eψe]ϕ, ` Aϕ, ` ∗Bϕ, ` Y¯ϕ necessitation
We present one more rule, called the event rule, which will make use of sequences of event modalities, modalities of the
form [ Eψe]. DefineΩ to be the set of all sequences of one or more event modalities, and letΩ+ add toΩ an empty string λ
that has no modalities (both of these sets depend on the language). We may use any string α ∈ Ω+ in expressing formulas.
For example λϕ is just ϕ. In order to state the event rule, we will define the following concerningΩ .
Definition 3.1 (Syntactic Precondition Function). Define Pre : Ω+ → Le+Y such that
• Pre(λ) = true,
• Pre([ Eψei] = ψi,
• Pre(α′α) = Pre(α′) ∧ α′Pre(α).
Definition 3.2 (Relations overΩ+). For each agent A ∈ A, define A−→⊆ Ω+ ×Ω+ to be the smallest relation for which the
following hold:
• λ A−→ λ.
• [ Eψe] A−→ [Eχ f ], whenever e A−→ f and for 1 ≤ k ≤ n, ψk = χk.
• αα′ A−→ ββ ′ whenever α, α′, β, β ′ ∈ Ω , α A−→ β and α′ A−→ β ′.
These two definitions do not depend on the break down of these strings. Given α ∈ Ω+, let there be formulas χβ for all β
for which α
B−→∗ β . Then
From ` χβ → βϕ and ` (χβ ∧ Pre(β))→ Aχγ
whenever A ∈ B, α B−→∗ β and β A−→ γ ,
infer ` χα → α∗Bϕ
 event rule
3.2. Soundness
Proposition 3.3. The axioms are sound.
Proof. The soundness proof for many of the axioms can be found for the soundness proofs of DEL. So here, I present proofs
of those not easily found in other work.
Atomic permanence for past. Y¯ p↔ (̂Y true→ p): The following are equivalent:
1. s ∈ [[Y¯ p]](H).
2. If prvh(H) 6= ∅, then prvs(s) ∈ [[p]](prvh(H)).
3. If s ∈ [[̂Y true]](H), then prvs(s) ∈ [[p]](prvh(H)).
4. If s ∈ [[̂Y true]](H), then s ∈ [[p]](H).
5. s ∈ [[̂Y true→ p]](H).
The step (3)⇔ (4) comes from the definition of valuation in the update product.
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Non-branching past. Y¯¬ϕ ↔ (̂Y true→ ¬Y¯ϕ): The following are equivalent:
1. s ∈ [[Y¯¬ψ]](H).
2. If prvh(H) 6= ∅, then prvs(s) ∈ [[¬ψ]](H).
3. If s ∈ [[̂Y true]](H), then prvs(s) 6∈ [[ψ]](H).
4. If s ∈ [[̂Y true]](H), then s 6∈ [[Yψ]](H).
5. s ∈ [[̂Y true→ ¬Yψ]](H).
Future past mix. [ Eψei]Y¯ϕ ↔ (ψi → ϕ): The following are equivalent:
1. s ∈ [[[ Eψei]Y¯ϕ]](H).
2. If (s, ei) ∈ H ⊗ E[[ψ]], then (s, ei) ∈ [[Y¯ϕ]](H ⊗ E[[ψ]]).
3. s ∈ [[ψi]](H), then (s, ei) ∈ [[Y¯ϕ]](H ⊗ E[[ψ]]).
4. If s ∈ [[ψi]](H), then s ∈ [[ϕ]](H).
5. s ∈ [[ψi → ϕ]](H).
Non-initial time. Ŷ true → AŶ true: Suppose s ∈ [[̂Y true]](H). Then prvh(H) 6= ∅ and prvs(s) ∈ [[ true]](prvh(H)).
If s
A−→ s′, then since prvh(H) 6= ∅ and prvs(s′) ∈ [[ true]](prvh(H)), s′ ∈ [[̂Y true]](H). As s′ was picked arbitrarily,
s ∈ [[AŶ true]](H).
Initial time. Y¯ false → AY¯ false: We shall argue by contrapositive. Suppose that s ∈ [[♦AŶ true]](H). Then there is an
s′ such that s′ ∈ [[̂Y true]](H). Thus prvh(H) 6= ∅ (as well as prvs(s′) ∈ [[ true]](prvh(H))). Hence prvh(H) 6= ∅ and
prvs(s) ∈ [[ true]](prvh(H)), whence s ∈ [[̂Y true]](H).
Epistemic past mix. Y¯Aϕ → AY¯ϕ: Suppose s ∈ [[Y¯Aϕ]](H). Then if prvh(H) 6= ∅, then prvs(s) ∈ [[Aϕ]](prvh(H)).
Now suppose s
A−→ s′. By definition of the update product, prvs(s) A−→ prvs(s′) granted prvh(H) 6= ∅. Now if prvh(H) 6= ∅,
then prvs(s′) ∈ [[ϕ]](prvh(H)), and hence s′ ∈ [[Y¯ϕ]](H). As s′ was picked arbitrarily, s ∈ [[AY¯ϕ]](H).
Restriction. e
A−→ A¬f (where¬(e A−→ f )): Suppose s ∈ [[e]](H), and suppose s A−→ s′. By the definition of the update product
relation, evnt(s)
A−→F evnt(s′). Note that evnt(s) = e. As it is not the case that e A−→ f , evnt(s′) 6= f . Hence s′ 6∈ [[f ]](H), and
s′ ∈ [[¬f ]](H). Hence s ∈ [[A¬f ]](H).
Past and event point mix. Ŷ true↔∨{e : e ∈ E}: The following are equivalent:
1. s ∈ [[̂Y true]](H).
2. evnt(s) = e for some e ∈ E, prvh(H) 6= ∅, and s ∈ H .
3. s ∈ [[∨{e : e ∈ E}]](H).
Uniqueness. e→ ¬f for all f 6= e: This is immediate from the fact that evnt is a function.
Future event point mix. [ Eψe]e: The following are equivalent:
1. s ∈ [[[ Eψei]ei]](H).
2. If (s, ei) ∈ H ⊗ E[[ψ]], then (s, ei) ∈ [[ei]](H ⊗ E[[ψ]]).
3. If s ∈ [[ψi]](H), then (s, ei) ∈ [[ei]](H ⊗ E[[ψ]]).
The last statement is true, for prvh(H ⊗ E[[ψ]]) = H 6= ∅ and evnt(s, ei) = ei. 
The soundness of the rule modus ponens and generalization are similar to the standard modal and propositional
arguments.
3.2.1. Soundness of the event rule
As the event rule involves strings of event models, it would be helpful to have notation that can better handle these
strings.
Definition 3.4 (Update Product Defined onΩ). Suppose n is the number of events in the event frame F . DefineH ⊗ α for
each historyH and α ∈ Ω as follows:
• H ⊗ [ Eψe] = H ⊗ Eψ .
• H ⊗ (αβ) = (H ⊗ α)⊗ β for α, β ∈ Ω .
Definition 3.5 (Update Product Defined on States). Suppose S is a state model, and n is the number of events in the event
frame F . We define x⊗ α for each x ∈ S and α ∈ Ω as follows:
• s⊗ [ Eψe] = (s, e).
• s⊗ (αβ) = (s⊗ α)⊗ β for α, β ∈ Ω .
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We next define a notion of equivalence on sequences of event modalities.
Definition 3.6. We write α ≈ β for α and β are equivalent, where≈ is the smallest relation for which the following hold.
• [Eϕe] ≈ [ Eψ f ]whenever e, f ∈ E and Eϕ = Eψ .
• (αβ) ≈ (α′β ′)whenever α ≈ α′ and β ≈ β ′.
Notice that if α
A−→Ω α′, then α ≈ α′.
We now can extend the semantics of event modalities to strings using the following lemma.
Lemma 3.7. Suppose α, γ ∈ Ω , and α ≈ α′. Then the following are equivalent.
• s ∈ [[αϕ]](H).
• (s⊗ α) ∈ [[ϕ]](H ⊗ α′) whenever s ∈ [[Pre(α)]](H).
Proof. We prove this by induction on the structure of α. The base case α = [ Eψe] follows from definitions; note that as
α ≈ α′, it is the case that α′ = [ Eψe′] for some e′ ∈ E. Suppose for α and β , if α′ ≈ α and β ′ ≈ β , then for every pointed
history H and every ϕ, the statement of the lemma holds (in the case of the β , replace every α by β and every α′ be β ′).
Then the following are equivalent.
1. s ∈ [[¬αβϕ]](H).
2. s ∈ [[Pre(α)]](H) and (s⊗ α) ∈ [[¬βϕ]](H ⊗ α′).
3. s ∈ [[Pre(α)]](H), (s⊗ α) ∈ [[Pre(β)]](H ⊗ α′), and ((s⊗ α)⊗ β) ∈ [[¬ϕ]]((H ⊗ α)⊗ β ′).
4. s ∈ [[Pre(α)]](H), s ∈ [[αPre(β)]](H), and ((s⊗ α)⊗ β) ∈ [[¬ϕ]](H ⊗ α′)⊗ β ′).
5. s ∈ [[Pre(αβ)]](H) and (s⊗ (αβ)) ∈ [[¬ϕ]](H ⊗ (α′β ′)).
The step (1) ⇔ (2) uses the inductive hypothesis for α. The step (2) ⇔ (3) uses the inductive hypothesis for β . The step
(3)⇔ (4) uses the inductive hypothesis for α. The step (4)⇔ (5) is by the definitions. Finally notice that αβ ≈ α′β ′. 
It is also helpful to establish a clear relationship between the precondition function Pre and membership in the model.
Lemma 3.8. Suppose α ∈ Ω . Then s ∈ [[Pre(α)]](H) iff (s⊗ α) ∈ (H ⊗ α).
Proof. Let us prove this simultaneously by structural induction on α. The base case α = [ Eψe] follows from definitions.
Assume the desired result for α and β for all pointed histories and formulas ϕ. Then the following are equivalent.
1. s ∈ [[Pre(αβ)]](H).
2. s ∈ [[Pre(α)]](H) and s ∈ [[αPre(β)]](H).
3. s ∈ [[Pre(α)]](H) and (s⊗ α) ∈ [[Pre(β)]](H ⊗ α).
4. ((s⊗ α)⊗ β) ∈ ((H ⊗ α)⊗ β).
5. (s⊗ (αβ)) ∈ (H ⊗ (αβ)).
The step (1)⇔ (2) comes from the definition of Pre and the semantics. The step (2)⇔ (3) comes from Lemma 3.7 applied
to α. The step (3) ⇔ (4) comes from the inductive hypothesis for β , as well as the fact that (s ⊗ α) ∈ [[Pre(β)]](H ⊗ α)
implies s ∈ [[Pre(α)]](H). 
The following lemma extends the behavior of the relation in the update product to handle sequences of update products
induced by sequences of event modalities.
Lemma 3.9. Suppose α ∈ Ω . Then the following are equivalent.
(a) t
A−→H⊗α t ′.
(b) There exists s, s′ ∈ H and β, β ′ ∈ Ω such that β ≈ α, s ∈ [[Pre(β)]](H), s′ ∈ [[Pre(β ′)]](H), s A−→H s′, and β A−→Ω β ′.
Proof. We prove this by induction on the length of α. The base case where α = [ Eψe] follows directly from the definitions.
Now suppose that α = γ , and suppose the desired result holds for γ and for  for any history H . The following are
equivalent:
1. t
A−→H⊗α t ′.
2. There exist u, u′ ∈ H ⊗ γ and ζ , ζ ′ ∈ Ω , such that  ≈ ζ , u ∈ [[Pre(ζ )]](H ⊗ γ ), u′ ∈ [[Pre(ζ ′)]](H ⊗ γ ), u A−→H⊗γ u′,
and ζ
A−→Ω ζ ′.
3. There exist s, s′ ∈ H and δ, δ′, ζ , ζ ′ ∈ Ω , such that γ ≈ δ,  ≈ ζ , s ∈ [[Pre(δ)]](H), s′ ∈ [[Pre(δ′)]](H),
(s⊗ δ) ∈ [[Pre(ζ )]](H ⊗ γ ), (s′ ⊗ δ′) ∈ [[Pre(ζ ′)]](H ⊗ γ ), s A−→H s′, δ A−→Ω δ′, and ζ A−→Ω ζ ′.
4. There exist s, s′ ∈ H and δ, δ′, ζ , ζ ′ ∈ Ω , such that γ ≈ δ,  ≈ ζ , s ∈ [[Pre(δ)]](H), s′ ∈ [[Pre(δ′)]](H),
s ∈ [[δPre(ζ )]](H), s′ ∈ [[δ′Pre(ζ ′)]](H), s A−→H s′, δ A−→Ω δ′, and ζ A−→Ω ζ ′.
5. There exist s, s′ ∈ H , β, β ′ ∈ Ω , such that α ≈ β , s ∈ [[Pre(β)]](H), s′ ∈ [[Pre(β ′)]](H), s A−→H s′, and β A−→Ω β ′.
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The step (1) ⇔ (2) is by the inductive hypothesis, letting t = u ⊗ ζ and t ′ = u ⊗ ζ ′. For the step (2) ⇔ (3), we use the
inductive hypothesis, letting u = s⊗ δ and u′ = s⊗ δ′. The step (3)⇔ (4) follows from Lemma 3.7. For the step (4)⇔ (5),
we let β = δζ and β ′ = δ′ζ ′, and recall that Pre(δζ ) = Pre(δ) ∧ δPre(ζ ). 
The following lemma provides us with a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of a path that will form the
foundation of the proof of the event rule’s soundness. This lemma will not only be used for the soundness of the event rule,
but also for the proof of Lemma 4.17.
Lemma 3.10. s ∈ [[¬α∗Bϕ]](H) iff there is a sequence of states fromH
s = s0 A1−→ s1 A2−→ · · · Ak−1−−→ sk−1 Ak−→ sk
where k ≥ 0 and each Ai ∈ B , and also a sequence inΩ+
α = α0 A1−→ α1 A2−→ · · · Ak−1−−→ αk−1 Ak−→ αk
such that si ∈ [[Pre(αi)]](H) for all i, where 0 ≤ i < k, and sk ∈ [[¬αkϕ]](H).
Proof. The proof here is mostly from [3]. The following are equivalent.
1. s ∈ [[¬α∗Bϕ]](H).
2. s ∈ [[Pre(α)]](H) and (s⊗ α) ∈ [[¬∗Bϕ]](H ⊗ α).
3. s ∈ [[Pre(α)]](H) and for some k ≥ 0, there exists a sequence inH ⊗ α
(s⊗ α) = t0 A1−→ t1 A2−→ · · · Ak−1−−→ tk−1 Ak−→ tk
such that Ai ∈ B and tk ∈ [[¬ϕ]](H ⊗ α).
4. There are sequences of s = s0, . . . , sk and α0, . . . , αk as in the statement of this lemma.
For (1) ⇔ (2), use Lemma 3.7. The step (2) ⇔ (3) comes from the definition of the semantics of ¬∗Bϕ. For (3) ⇔ (4),
iterate Lemma 3.9 and use Lemma 3.7 for step k. 
Proposition 3.11. The event rule is sound.
Proof. If α = λ or α = [ Eψe], then the proof of soundness in [9] (Proposition 6.37 in [9]) can be applied here. For longer
strings, we follow the proof in [3], which goes as follows. Suppose α ∈ Ω and for every β such that α B−→∗ β there are
formulas χβ such that whenever α
B−→ β and β A−→ γ for some A ∈ A, the following event rule validity assumptions hold:
(a) [[χβ → βψ]] = [[ true]]
(b) [[(χβ ∧ Pre(β))→ Aχγ ]] = [[ true]].
Wewish to show that [[χα → α∗Bψ]] = [[ true]]. Suppose that s ∈ [[χα]](H), and for a contradiction that s ∈ [[¬α∗Bψ]](H).
By Lemma 3.10, we have a sequence of states inH
s = s0 A1−→ s1 A2−→ · · · Ak−1−−→ sk−1 Ak−→ sk
where k ≥ 0 and each Ai ∈ B, and also a sequence itΩ
α = α0 A1−→ α1 A2−→ · · · Ak−1−−→ αk−1 Ak−→ αk
such that si ∈ [[Pre(αi)]](H) for all i, where 0 ≤ i < k, and sk ∈ [[¬αkψ]](H). First, if k = 0, we would have that
s ∈ [[¬αψ]](H). By the event rule validity assumption (a), [[χα → αψ]] = [[ true]], whence s ∈ [[χα → αψ]](H). By our
initial assumption that s ∈ [[χα]](H), we get s ∈ [[αψ]](H), contradicting the result of the lemma that sk ∈ [[¬αkψ]](H).
If k > 0, we show by induction on 1 ≤ i ≤ k that si ∈ [[χαi ]](H). The case where i = 0 comes from the initial assumption
that s ∈ [[χα]](H). Assume that si ∈ [[χαi ]](H). By Lemma 3.10, si ∈ [[Pre(αi)]](H). From this and the event rule validity
assumption (b), si ∈ [[Ai+1χαi+1 ]](H). Hence si+1 ∈ [[χαi+1 ]](H). This completes our induction.
In particular, sk ∈ [[χαk ]](H). Using again the event rule validity assumption (a), we have sk ∈ [[αkψ]](H). 
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3.3. Provable equivalence and examples of provable formulas
Definition 3.12 (Provable Equivalence). We say that sentences ϕ and ψ are provably equivalent, and write ϕ ≡ ψ , iff
` ϕ ↔ ψ .
Proposition 3.13 (Extended Event Model Partial Functionality). ` α¬ϕ ↔ (Pre(α)→ ¬αϕ), for every α ∈ Ω .
Proof. Weprove this by induction onα. The base case for basic programs comes precisely from the axiom eventmodel partial
functionality.
Suppose the result holds for α. For the inductive step for basic actions, we see that the following are provably equivalent.
1. [ Eψei]α¬ϕ.
2. [ Eψei](Pre(α)→ ¬αϕ).
3. [ Eψei]¬(Pre(α) ∧ αϕ).
4. ψi → ¬[ Eψei](Pre(α) ∧ αϕ).
5. ψi → ¬([ Eψei]Pre(α) ∧ [ Eψei]αϕ).
6. (ψi → ¬[ Eψei]Pre(α)) ∨ ¬[ Eψei]αϕ.
7. [ Eψei]¬Pre(α) ∨ ¬[ Eψiei]αϕ.
8. 〈 Eψei〉Pre(α)→ ¬[ Eψiei]αϕ.
9. Pre([ Eψei]α)→ ¬[ Eψiei]αϕ.
The step ` (2)↔ (3) uses the inductive hypothesis. 
Proposition 3.14 (Extended Epistemic Future Mix). ` αAϕ ↔ (Pre(α)→∧{Aβϕ : α A−→Ω β}).
Proof. This proof is mostly from [3] (known as action-knowledge). It is proved by induction on α.
If α is of the form [ Eψei], then we simply have the axiom epistemic future mix in the form we know it.
So assume the desired result for α′ and α; we prove it for α′α. We will show that
` α′αAϕ ↔
(
Pre(α′α)→
∧
{Aβ ′βϕ : (α′α) A−→ (β ′β)}
)
. (1)
We start by using the inductive hypothesis on α to get the equivalence ` αAϕ ↔ (Pre(α) → ∧{Aβϕ : α A−→ β}). We
then use necessitation and normality multiple times, and get
` α′αAϕ ↔
(
α′Pre(α)→
∧
{α′Aβϕ : α A−→ β}
)
. (2)
By the inductive hypothesis on α′, we have that for all β
` α′Aβϕ ↔
(
Pre(α′)→
∧
{Aβ ′βϕ;α′ A−→ β ′}
)
.
This and (2) leads the provable equivalence of α′αAϕ and
α′Pre(α)→
(
Pre(α′)→
∧
{Aβ ′βϕ : α A−→β , α′ A−→ β ′}
)
.
By definition, Pre(α′α) = Pre(α′)∧α′Pre(α). In addition, we have by definition α′α A−→ β ′β iff α′ A−→ β ′ and α A−→ β . Using
these observations and some propositional reasoning, we get (1), as desired. 
Proposition 3.15. ` α∗Bϕ ↔ (Pre(α)→
∧{Aβ∗Bϕ : α A−→Ω β}).
Proof. The following are provably equivalent.
1. α∗Bϕ.
2. αA∗Bϕ.
3. Pre(α)→∧{Aβ∗Bϕ : α A−→Ω β}.
The first provable equivalence is from the axiom epistemic mix, the many applications of necessitation and modal logic. The
second provable equivalence is from Proposition 3.14 (extended epistemic future mix). 
Proposition 3.16. ` ŶAϕ→ AŶϕ.
Proof. Each of these steps holds.
1. ` ŶAϕ→ (Y¯Aϕ ∧ Ŷ true) by non-branching past.
2. (Y¯Aϕ ∧ Ŷ true)→ (AY¯ϕ ∧ Ŷ true) by epistemic past mix and propositional logic.
3. (AY¯ϕ ∧ Ŷ true)→ (AY¯ϕ ∧ AŶ true) by non-initial time and propositional logic.
4. (AY¯ϕ ∧ AŶ true)→ AŶϕ. 
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The following proposition helps characterize the fact that every epistemically related state must be the ‘‘same time’’ as
the original.
Proposition 3.17. The following hold for each n.
(a) ` Y¯ n false→ AY¯ n false (extended initial-time).
(b) ` Ŷ n true→ AŶ n true (extended non-initial-time).
Proof. We prove both by induction on n. The base cases for (a) and (b) are the axioms Y¯ false → AY¯ false and Ŷ true →
AŶ true respectively. For the inductive step for (a), assume ` Y¯ n false→ AY¯ false. Then ` Y¯ Y¯ n false→ Y¯AY¯ n false and
our desired result comes from the repeated applications of the axiom ` Y¯Aϕ → AY¯ϕ and modus ponens. The inductive
step for (b) is similar, but uses Proposition 3.16 instead of epistemic past mix. 
Proposition 3.18. If i 6= j, then
` [ Eψei]ej ↔ ¬ψi.
Proof. The following are provably equivalent:
1. [ Eψei]ej
2. [ Eψei]ej ∧ true
3. [ Eψei]ej ∧ [ Eψei]ei
4. [ Eψei](ej ∧ ei)
5. [ Eψei]¬ true
6. ψi → ¬[ Eψei] true
7. ¬ψi. 
4. Epistemic temporal models
Capturing a sequence of state models from maximal consistent sets can be challenging, and it may be easiest to first
consider one model whose states constitute the union of the state models we wish to have in our history. We thus define
an Epistemic Temporal Model (ETM), that augments a state model with two components, one of which is a previous-time
relation Y and the other being a function ε assigning the event point that is true at a given state.
Definition 4.1 (Epistemic Temporal Model). Given an event frame F (with A the corresponding set of agents and E the set
of event points) and a set Φ of atomic propositions, define an epistemic temporal model (ETM) to be a tupleM = (S,→,
‖ · ‖, Y , ε), where
1. S is a set,
2. →: A→ S × S is a function that assigns a binary relation A−→ over S for every agent A ∈ A,
3. ‖ · ‖ is a function mapping each proposition letter inΦ to a subset of S,
4. Y ⊆ S × S is a binary relation over S,
5. ε : S → E ∪ {∅} is a function assigning either an event point or ∅ to every state in S.
Ideally the relation Y will partition an ETM into state models so that Y relates a state in what shall be one state model
to a state in what shall be the previous state model. While the semantics for sequence histories is dynamic, because a new
history is constructed every time past or future operators are considered, we aim to define a static semantics for ETMs,
that is a semantics involving just the one model. Our aim will be for no new instances of models to be considered in
the description of the semantics, just the one original model. The involvement of the relation Y in an ETM will make the
semantics of the past easy: the operator Y¯ will be defined in terms of the relation Y just as A is defined in terms of the
epistemic relation
A−→. But the future still presents a challenge, and we will find it helpful to reduce in the language the
occurrences of event operators, operators of the form [ Eψe]. We will do this by defining a sublanguage of Le+Y , that has
the reduced occurrences of event modalities, and then translating every Le+Y formula into a provably equivalent in the
sublanguage.
4.1. Translation
To simplify the semantics for event operators in the ETM semantics, we limit the occurrences of event modalities so that
strings of event modalities only occur before common knowledgemodalities∗B. More specifically, we define a sublanguage
ofLe+Y , calledLrf (where rf stands for restricted form).
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Definition 4.2 (LanguageLrf). Given an event frame F = (E,→F , ‖ · ‖F ) and a setΦ of proposition letters, letLrf(F ,Φ)
be defined to be the set of formulas in the following two sorted systemwith formulas and event formulas. Formulas are given
by the Bachus–Naur form:
ϕ ::= true | p | e | ¬ϕ |ϕ ∧ ψ | η |Aϕ |∗Bϕ | Y¯ϕ
where p ∈ Φ is an atomic proposition, e ∈ E is an event point, A ∈ A is an agent, B ⊆ A is a set of agents, and ϕ, ψ ,
ψ1, . . . , ψn are formulas, and η is an event formula.
Event formulas are given by
η ::= [ψ1, . . . , ψn, e]∗Bϕ | [ψ1, . . . , ψn, e]η
where ϕ, ψ , ψ1, . . . , ψn are formulas and η is an event formula.
The following definition extends one in [9]. In what follows, let {c( Eψ)} = {c(ψ1), . . . , c(ψn)}.
Definition 4.3 (Complexity). The complexity of a formula in Le+Y (F ,Φ) is given by a function c : Le+Y → N, defined
inductively by
c( true) = 1
c(p) = 1
c(e) = 1
c(¬ϕ) = 1+ c(ϕ)
c(ϕ ∧ ψ) = 1+max{c(ϕ), c(ψ)}
c(Aϕ) = 1+ c(ϕ)
c(∗Bϕ) = 1+ c(ϕ)
c(Y¯ϕ) = 1+ c(ϕ)
c([ Eψe]ϕ) = (4+ |E| +max{c( Eψ)})c(ϕ)
where |E| is the size of the fixed set E of event points.
In what follows, let [t( Eψ), e] = [t(ψ1), . . . , t(ψn), e]. Let α represent a string of 0 or more possibly but not necessarily
distinct event modalities.
Definition 4.4 (Translation). Define the following translation:
t( true) = true t(α[ Eψe] true) = t(α true)
t(p) = p t(α[ Eψei]p) = t(α(ψi → p))
t(e) = e t(α[ Eψei]ei) = t(α true)
t(α[ Eψei]ek) = t(α¬ψi) (where i 6= k)
t(¬ϕ) = ¬t(ϕ) t(α[ Eψei]¬ϕ) = t(α(ψi → ¬[ Eψei]ϕ))
t(ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2) = t(ϕ1) ∧ t(ϕ2) t(α[ Eψe](ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2)) = t(α([ Eψe]ϕ1 ∧ [ Eψe]ϕ2))
t(Y¯ϕ) = Y¯ t(ϕ) t(α[ Eψei]Y¯ϕ) = t(α(ψi → ϕ))
t(Aϕ) = At(ϕ) t(α[ Eψei]Aϕ) = t
(
α
(
ψi →∧{ek:ei A−→ek} A[ Eψek]ϕ
))
t(∗Bϕ) = ∗Bt(ϕ) t([ Eψe]α∗Bϕ) = [t( Eψ)e]t(α∗Bϕ)
Definition 4.5 (Subformula Function). For a formula ϕ, let sub(ϕ) be the set of all subformulas of ϕ.
To show this is well defined, we observe the following proposition.
Proposition 4.6. The following hold:
1. c(ϕ) ≥ c(ψ) for all ψ ∈ sub(ϕ)
2. c(αϕ) > c(αψ) whenever c(ϕ) > c(ψ)
3. c([ Eψei]p) > c(ψi → p)
4. c([ Eψei]ei) > c( true)
5. c([ Eψei]ek) > c(¬ψi) (where i 6= k)
6. c([ Eψei]¬ϕ) > c(ψi → ¬[ Eψei]ϕ)
7. c([ Eψe](ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2)) > c([ Eψe]ϕ1 ∧ [ Eψe]ϕ2)
8. c([ Eψei]Y¯ϕ) > c(ψi → ϕ)
9. c([ Eψei]Aϕ) > c
(
ψi →∧{A[ Eψek]ϕ : ei A−→F ek}).
Proof. Most of these cases are from the book [9]. So only select cases are proved here. For (8):
c([ Eψei]Y¯ϕ) = (4+ |E| +max{c( Eψ)})(1+ c(ϕ))
> 2+max{2+ c(ψi), 1+ c(ϕ)}
= c(ψi → ϕ).
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For (9):
c([ Eψei]Aϕ) = (4+ |E| +max{c( Eψ)})(1+ c(ϕ))
> 4+ |E| + (4+ |E| +max{c( Eψ)})c(ϕ)
= 2+max{2+ c(ψi), 1+ |E| +max{1+ (4+ |E| +max{c( Eψ)})c(ϕ)}}
≥ c(¬(¬¬ψi ∧ ¬
∧
{A[ Eψek]ϕ : ei A−→ ek}))
= c(ψi →
∧
{A[ Eψek]ϕ : ei A−→F ek}). 
Wenowwish to show that the transformation t behaves in a desirable fashion. One can see that for all formulasϕ inLe+Y ,
t(ϕ) is in Lrf, since any formula not in Lrf contains an occurrence of an event modality that is not followed by a common
knowledgemodality or another eventmodality. The translation function is defined to decompose such formulas, andwe see
from Proposition 4.6 that such a decomposition either reduces the complexity of the formula unless the formula has only
one symbol or acts on subformulas.
Proposition 4.7. For every formula ϕ ∈ Le+Y , c(t(ϕ)) ≤ c(ϕ). We have c(t(ϕ)) = c(ϕ) if and only if t(ϕ) = ϕ.
Proof. This is a straightforward proof by induction on the complexity of formulas, where each step follows from the
definition of the translation or from Proposition 4.6. Every change t makes to a formula reduces its complexity. 
Proposition 4.8. The translation t is a computable function.
Proof. We can prove by induction on the complexity of formulas ϕ that t(ϕ) is computable, by noticing that every
application of t either terminates (in the case of single symbol formulas), acts on subformulas (in the case of formulas whose
main connective is not an eventmodality), or decreases the complexity of the argument (in the case of formulas whosemain
connective is an event modality). 
Definition 4.9 (Syntactic Equivalence). We now define a relation ≡ on the set Ω+ of strings of event modalities to be the
smallest relation for which the following hold.
• λ ≡ λ, where λ is the empty string.
• [ Eψe] ≡ [Eχ f ] iff e = f and ` ψi ↔ χi for 1 ≤ i ≤ n (where n is the number of event points in the fixed event frame.
• αβ ≡ α′β ′ iff α ≡ α′ and β ≡ β ′ for each α, α′, β, β ′ ∈ Ω .
Lemma 4.10. Whenever α B−→∗ β , we have that c(αϕ) = c(βϕ) for any ϕ.
Proof. This is a straightforward induction proof on the length of α. It uses the fact that for every event model is α,
the corresponding event model in β has the exact same preconditions. The inductive step uses the following equation
c([ Eψe]α′ϕ) = (4+ |E| +max{c( Eψ)})c(α′ϕ), where we can apply the inductive hypothesis to α′ϕ. 
Lemma 4.11. For any α ∈ Ω and ϕ ∈ Le+Y , c(Pre(α)) < c(αϕ).
Proof. We prove by induction on the number of event modalities in α the stronger claim that c(Pre(α))+ 1 < c(αϕ). For
the base case α = [ Eψei], and hence c(Pre(α)) = c(ψi) < (4 + |E| +max(c( Eψ)))c(ϕ). For the inductive step, suppose the
desired result holds for β . Then
c(Pre([ Eψei]α) = c(ψi ∧ [ Eψei]Pre(α))
= 1+max{c(ψi), c([ Eψei]Pre(α))}
= 1+ (4+ |E| +max(c( Eψ)))c(Pre(α))
< (4+ |E| +max(c( Eψ)))(c(Pre(α))+ 1)
< (4+ |E| +max(c( Eψ)))c(αϕ)
= c([ Eψei]αϕ). 
We next wish to show that every formula is provably equivalent to its translation.
Theorem 4.12. For all formulas ϕ inLe+Y , ` ϕ ↔ t(ϕ).
Proof. We will prove this by induction on the complexity of ϕ. Much of the proof is similar to a similar proof in [9], but to
help with cases involving common knowledge, we will use a stronger inductive hypothesis that will have two parts.
Inductive hypotheses: Two inductive hypotheses are as follows.
(a) ` ϕ ↔ t(ϕ), whenever c(ϕ) ≤ k.
(b) ` αϕ ↔ α′ϕ, whenever α ∈ Ω+, α ≡ α′ and c(αϕ), c(α′ϕ) ≤ k.
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We list the base case and the inductive step cases below. Some inductive step cases depend on other inductive step cases.
The cases are arranged so that no case depends on one that has not yet been proved.
(a) cases γ true (γ ∈ Ω+), p, e, ¬ϕ, ϕ ∧ ψ , Y¯ϕ, Aϕ, ∗Bϕ: These are straightforward.
(a) cases [ Eψe]p, [ Eψe]¬ϕ, [ Eψe](ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2), [ Eψe]Aϕ: These cases are in [9].
(a) case [ Eψei]ei: This case is immediate from the fact that [ Eψei]ei is provably equivalent to true = t([ Eψei]ei) by the axiom
future event point mix.
(a) case [ Eψei]ej (i 6= j): This case is immediate from Definition 4.4 and Proposition 3.18.
(a) case [ Eψei]Y¯ϕ: This case is immediate from Definition 4.4 and axiom future past mix.
(a) cases γ [ Eψei]ϕ, where ϕ = p, ei, ej(j 6= i),¬χ, χ1 ∧ χ2,Aχ, Y¯χ and γ ∈ Ω: For each of these, observe that
t(γ [ Eψei]ϕ) = t(γ t([ Eψei]ϕ)). Also, given the cases for what ϕ can be, t([ Eψei]ϕ) 6= [ Eψei]ϕ. Then by Proposition 4.7 that
c(t([ Eψei]ϕ)) < c([ Eψei]ϕ), whence c(γ t([ Eψei]ϕ) < c(γ [ Eψei]ϕ) = k+ 1. Also note that γ is not the empty string λ, and
hence c([ Eψei]ϕ) < c(γ [ Eψei]ϕ) = k+ 1. We then apply the inductive hypothesis (a) to get both provable equivalences
in the following (note that necessitation is also used to establish the first provable equivalence):
γ [ Eψei]ϕ ≡ γ t([ Eψei]ϕ) ≡ t(γ t([ Eψei]ϕ)) = t(γ [ Eψei]ϕ)
(b) case for γ true (γ ∈ Ω+): This case is immediate.
(b) cases for γ ϕ, where ϕ = p, e,¬χ, χ1 ∧ χ2,Aχ, Y¯χ and γ ∈ Ω+: Assume that c(αγ ϕ), c(α′γ ϕ) ≤ k + 1. Note that
given the cases for what ϕ can be, t(αγ ϕ) 6= αγϕ. Then by Proposition 4.7, c(t(αγ ϕ)) < c(αγ ϕ) and similarly for
α′γ ϕ. Then
αγϕ ≡1 t(αγ ϕ) ≡2 t(α′γ ϕ) ≡3 α′γ ϕ.
The provable equivalences≡1 and≡3 come from inductive steps (a) already proved above. Note that these (a) cases do
not depend on any other cases, only the inductive hypothesis. The provable equivalence≡2 is a direct application of the
inductive hypothesis (b).
(b) case ∗Bϕ: Assume c(α∗Bϕ), c(α′∗Bϕ) ≤ k + 1. We use the event rule to show that ` α∗Bϕ → α′∗Bϕ; the other
direction uses the same argument. For every β, γ , for which α
B−→∗ β , and β A−→ γ , we have
(1) ` β∗Bϕ→ βϕ and
(2) ` β∗Bϕ ∧ Pre(β)→ Aγ∗Bϕ, for each A ∈ B.
The justification for these two is from [3] and goes as follows: (1) follows from the axiom epistemic mix and modal
reasoning. For (2), we start with a consequence of the axiom epistemicmix:` ∗Bϕ→ A∗Bϕ. Then bymodal reasoning,` β∗Bϕ→ βA∗Bϕ. Then by the extended event knowledge axiom (Proposition 3.14) and propositional logic, we have` β∗Bϕ ∧ Pre(β)→ Aγ∗Bϕ.
A simple induction argument on the length of α gives us the following: for every β ′ for which α′ B−→∗ β ′, there
is a unique β for which α
B−→∗ β and β ≡ β ′. Note that c(αϕ) < c(α∗Bϕ) ≤ k + 1 and similarly with α′. By
Lemma 4.10, c(βϕ) = c(αϕ) < k + 1 and similarly with the β ′. We can also use Lemma 4.11 to establish that
c(Pre(β)) < c(βϕ) < k+ 1, and similarly with β ′. Thus we can apply the induction hypothesis (b) to get ` βϕ ↔ β ′ϕ.
A straightforward induction on the length of β together using many applications of the inductive hypothesis (b) yields
` Pre(β)↔ Pre(β ′). Thus we have
(1′) ` β∗Bϕ→ β ′ϕ and
(2′) ` β∗Bϕ ∧ Pre(β ′)→ Aγ∗Bϕ, for each A ∈ B.
By the event rule, ` α∗Bϕ→ α′∗Bϕ.
(b) case [ Eψe]γ∗Bϕ (γ ∈ Ω+): Assume c(α[ Eψe]γ∗Bϕ), c(α′[ Eψe]γ∗Bϕ) ≤ k+ 1. This is almost identical to the case (b) for
∗Bϕ. Replace α in the previous argument with α[ Eψe]γ and α′ with α′[ Eψe]γ .
(a) case [ Eψe]γ∗Bϕ (γ ∈ Ω+): Assume c([ Eψe]γ∗Bϕ) = k+ 1. Then
[ Eψe]γ∗Bϕ ≡1 [t( Eψ)e]t(γ∗Bϕ) ≡2 t([ Eψe]t(γ∗Bϕ)) = t([ Eψe]γ∗Bϕ).
The first provable equivalence ≡1 comes from the inductive hypothesis (a) and inductive step (b) cases for γ∗Bϕ or
∗Bϕ, depending on whether γ = λ in this step. Note that these two inductive step cases do not make use of any other
inductive step case (just the inductive hypotheses). The second provable equivalence≡2 comes from Definition 4.4 and
the inductive hypothesis (b). 
4.2. Epistemic temporal semantics and histories
Definition 4.13 (Epistemic Temporal Semantics). The semantics shall be defined as the smallest relation  between pointed
epistemic temporal models and formulas in Lrf for which the following holds:M, x  true for all pointed models (M, x)
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and
M, x  p iff x ∈ ‖p‖
M, x  e iff e = ε(x)
M, x  ¬ψ iff M, x 2 ψ (meaning it is not the case thatM, x  ψ)
M, x  ψ1 ∧ ψ2 iff M, x  ψ1 andM, x  ψ2
M, x  Y¯ψ iff M, z  ψ whenever xYz
M, x  Aψ iff M, z  ψ whenever x
A−→ z
M, x  ∗Bψ iff M, z  ψ whenever x
B−→∗ z
M, x  α∗Bψ iff

M, xk  t(αkψ) for all sequences of length k ≥ 0
x = x0 A1−→ x1 A2−→ · · · Ak−1−−→ xk−1 Ak−→ xk
α = α0 A1−→Ω α1 A2−→Ω · · · Ak−1−−→Ω αk−1 Ak−→Ω αk
such that each Ai ∈ B andM, xi  t(Pre(αi)) for each i < k.
Note that if ε(x) = ∅, there is no event point ewhich is true at x.
Definition 4.14 (Characterizable Epistemic Temporal History). Given an event frame F and set Φ of atomic propositions, a
structureM = (S, ,−→ ‖ · ‖, Y , ε) is called an epistemic temporal history (ETH) if it has the following properties.
1. Event points: ε(x) 6= ∅ iff there exists z such that xYz.
2. Partial functionality of Y : If xYz and xYz ′ then z = z ′.
3. Bounded age: There exists N such that for all x there is no z for which xYNz.
4. Synchronicity: if x
A−→ z, then for each n, xY nx′ for some x′ iff zY nz ′ for some z ′.
5. States a: If uYz, xYz, and x 6= u, then ε(u) 6= ε(x). We may view this property using the following diagram, where solid
arrows are assumed in the premise and the dotted line expresses the conclusion. If u 6= x then
6. States b: For each event point e ∈ E and each k ≥ 0, there exists a formula ϕ ∈ Lrf such that for every x for which xY kz
for some z and xY k+1z for no z,
M, x  ϕ iff there is a u such that ε(u) = e and uYx.
7. Relation a: If x
A−→ zYz ′, there exists an x′ such that xYx′ A−→ z ′. We may view this using the following diagram, where the
solid arrows are assumed in the premise, and the dotted arrow is the conclusion.
(Considering the contrapositive, we see that certainty in the past translates to certainty in the present, which is the
perfect recall condition.)
8. Relation b: If x
A−→ z, and ε(x) 6= ∅, then ε(x) A−→F ε(z). (This is related to uniform no-miracles.)
9. Relation c: If xYx′, zYz ′, x′ A−→ z ′, and ε(x) A−→ ε(z), then x A−→ z. (This is related to uniform no-miracles.) We may view
this property using the following diagram, where solid arrows are part of the premise and the dotted arrow is part of
the conclusion. If ε(x)
A−→ ε(z)
10. Valuation: If xYz, thenM, x  p iffM, z  p.
An epistemic temporalmodel satisfying all conditions except states b of a characterizable epistemic temporal history is called
an epistemic temporal history that is not necessarily characterizable. This notion will be helpful in establishing the proof of
Lemma 4.16, which will show that a ETH is isomorphic to a sequential history, using the following notion of isomorphism.
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Definition 4.15 (Isomorphism). A ETM M = (X,→, Y , g, ‖ · ‖) is isomorphic to a state model sequence H =
(S0, S1, . . . , Sn)with Sk = (Sk,→k, ‖ · ‖k) if there exists a bijective function f from X to⋃nk=0 Sk, such that
1. x ∈ ‖p‖ iff f (x) ∈ ‖p‖k if f (k) ∈ Sk.
2. ε(x) = e iff f (x) = (y, e) for some y ∈ Sk with 0 ≤ k < n.
3. x
A−→ z iff f (x) A−→k f (z) if f (x) ∈ Sk.
4. xYz iff f (x) = (f (z), g(x)).
The function f is called an isomorphism.
Lemma 4.16. Every ETH is isomorphic to some sequential history.
Proof. SupposeM = (SH , A−→H , YH , gH , ‖ · ‖H) is an ETH for an event frame F and setΦ of atomic propositions. Let
S0 = {x ∈ SH : ε(x) = ∅}.
By event points (condition 1) and partial functionality of Y (condition 2), we can uniquely map every state x 6∈ S0 to (z, e),
where xYz and e = ε(x). Using this, let
f (x) =
{
x x ∈ S0
(f (z), e) xYz, e = ε(x).
Condition 5, states a, ensures that f is injective. We will partition the image of f into the carrier sets of state models that
form a sequential history. For each k > 0, let
Sk = {f (x) : xY kz for some z ∈ S, and xY k+1z for no z}.
By bounded age (condition 3), there is an N such that for every x ∈ M, f (x) will be in some Sk for k ≤ N . By synchronicity
(condition 4), we know that if f (x) ∈ Sk and x A−→ z then f (z) ∈ Sk. Then for each set Sk, we define Sk = (Sk,→k, ‖ · ‖k),
where
1. f (x)
A−→k f (z) if both x A−→H z and f (x) ∈ Sk (and hence f (z) ∈ Sk).
2. ‖p‖k = Sk ∩ {f (x) : x ∈ ‖p‖H}.
We now have a sequence of state models.
Let us construct a list of alleged sequential histories as follows: H0 = (S0) and for each k, Hk+1 = (S0, . . . , Sk+1).
Finally, we let H = HN . To see that each Hk is a history, we must show that each follows from the previous from some
update product. We do not claim in this lemma that we are proving that this sequential history is characterizable. But we
will later use states b (condition 6) and Lemma 4.17 to show that ifM were characterizable, then this sequential history
would be too. The relation condition of an update product requires that if (s, e) and (t, g) both exist, then (s, e)
A−→ (t, g)
iff both s
A−→ t and e A−→F g . Observe that relation a and relation b (conditions 7 and 8) give us the only if, and relation c
(condition 9) gives us the if. Finally, valuation (condition 10) guarantees us the valuation condition of the update product.
The isomorphism properties for f are immediate from the construction of the sequential historyH . 
We finally see that this isomorphism preserves truth of normal form formulas.
Lemma 4.17. Given an epistemic temporal historyM, a sequential historyH , an isomorphism f fromM to H, any x ∈ M, and
any formula ϕ ∈ Lrf,
M, x  ϕ iff f (x) ∈ [[ϕ]](prvhk(H)),
where k is such that f (x) ∈ prvhk(H).
Proof. Fix an epistemic temporal historyM = (SM ,→M , YM , εM , ‖ ·‖M) and a sequential historyH . LetH = (S0, . . . , SN),
where for 0 ≤ k ≤ N ,Hk = (S0, . . . , Sk) and Sk = (Sk,→k, ‖ · ‖k).
We prove the desired result by induction on the complexity of the formula ϕ.
Inductive hypothesis: M, x  ϕ iff f (x) ∈ [[ϕ]](Hk) for each x for which f (x) ∈ Sk, and each ϕ ∈ Lrf for which c(ϕ) ≤ j.
base cases true, p, e: These are straightforward from definitions. Note that ε(x) = e iff f (x) = (y, e) for some y ∈ Sk with
0 ≤ k < n.
cases ¬ψ and ψ1 ∧ ψ2: These are also straightforward.
case Y¯ψ :We first consider x such that f (x) ∈ S0. By definition of f , there is no z such that xYz, and henceM, x  Y¯ψ .
AsH0 has no past, f (x) ∈ [[Y¯ψ]](H0).
Next suppose f (x) ∈ Sk for k > 0. By the property xYz iff f (x) = (f (z), g(x)), there is exactly one z for which
xYz. Hence the following are equivalent:
1. M, x  Y¯ψ
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2. M, z  ψ
3. f (z) ∈ [[ψ]](Hk−1)
4. f (x) ∈ [[Y¯ψ]](Hk)
cases Aψ and ∗Bψ : These come from the tight connection between
A−→ inM and A−→k in each Sk. Note that if x A−→M z,
then f (x)
A−→k f (z) for some k, and hence f (x) and f (z) are in the same state model.
case α∗Bψ for α ∈ Ω: First suppose thatM, x 2 α∗Bψ . Then there is a sequence
x = x0 A1−→ x1 A2−→ · · · Ak−1−−→ xk−1 Ak−→ xk
inM such that k ≥ 0, each Ai ∈ B, and a sequence
α = α0 A1−→Ω α1 A2−→Ω · · · Ak−1−−→Ω αk−1 Ak−→Ω αk
such that M, xi  t(Pre(αi)) for each 0 ≤ i ≤ k, and M, xk  t(¬αkψ). To apply the inductive hypothesis,
we observe that c(t(Pre(αi))) ≤ c(Pre(αi)) < c(αiψ) = c(αψ) < c(α∗Bψ) and c(t(¬αkψ)) ≤ c(¬αkψ) =
c(¬αψ) < c(α∗Bψ) (note that α 6= λ), by Proposition 4.7 and Lemmas 4.10 and 4.11. After applying the inductive
hypotheses, we use Lemma 3.10. The other direction is parallel to this one. 
Lemma 4.18. Every characterizable ETH is isomorphic to some characterizable sequential history.
Proof. In the proof of Lemma 4.16, we constructed a sequence of state models Sk and historiesHk. We wish to show that
Hk+1 = Hk ⊗ [[Eϕ]]. For each k ≥ 0, we have by states b (condition 6) a formula ϕi for each ei, such that for every x where
xY kz for some z and xY k+1z for no z,
M, x  ϕi iff there is aw such that ε(w) = ei andwYx.
We let Eϕ be the list of each of these formulas. Our desired result follows from Lemma 4.17. 
4.3. Bisimulations
Definition 4.19 (Bisimulation between ETMs). A bisimulation between ETMs M1 = (S1,→1, Y1, ε1, ‖ · ‖1) and M2 =
(S2,→2, Y2, ε2, ‖ · ‖2) is a relation R ⊆ S1 × S2 such that the following hold.
1. if xRz then for all p ∈ Φ , x ∈ ‖p‖1 iff z ∈ ‖p‖2.
2. if xRz then ε1(x) = ε2(z).
3. if xRz and x
A−→1 x′, then there exists z ′ such that x′Rz ′ and z A−→2 z ′.
4. if xRz and z
A−→2 z ′, then there exists x′ such that x′Rz ′ and z A−→1 z ′.
5. if xRz and xY1x′, then there exists z ′ such that x′Rz ′ and zY2z ′.
6. if xRz and zY2z ′, then there exists x′ such that x′Rz ′ and zY1z ′.
Two states x and z are said to be bisimilar if xRz for some bisimulation R. If there is a bisimulation between two ETMs, they
are said to be bisimilar.
Lemma 4.20. IfM1 andM2 are two ETMs, x ∈ S1, z ∈ S2, and x and z are bisimilar, then for every ψ ∈ Lrf,
M1, x  ψ iff M2, z  ψ
Proof. Let R be a bisimulation betweenM1 andM2 for which xRz. We prove this by induction on the complexity of the
formula.
Inductive hypothesis: M1, a  ϕ iffM2, b  ϕ, whenever c(ϕ) ≤ k and aRb.
Base cases true, p, e: These come directly from the definition of bisimulation.
Cases ¬ψ , ψ1 ∧ ψ2, Y¯ψ , Aψ : These use standard modal arguments.
Case ∗Bψ : Suppose thatM1, x 2 ∗Bψ . ThenM1, x  ¬♦∗Bψ . Then there exists a path of states connected by epistemic
relations for agents in B from x to another state x′ for which¬ψ is true. Repeating property (3) of the bisimulation
gives us a path using the same relation from z to z ′ for which x′Rz ′. We apply the inductive hypothesis to determine
thatM2, z ′  ¬ψ , and henceM2, z 2 ∗Bψ . The converse is similar, except we use property (4) rather than (3).
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Case α∗Bψ (α ∈ Ω): Suppose thatM1, x 2 α∗Bψ . Then there exists a sequence
x = x0 A1−→ x1 A2−→ · · · Ak−1−−→ xk−1 Ak−→ xk
inM1 such that k ≥ 0, each Ai ∈ B and a sequence
α = α0 A1−→Ω α1 A2−→Ω · · · Ak−1−−→Ω αk−1 Ak−→Ω αk
such thatM1, xi  t(Pre(αi)) for each 0 ≤ i ≤ k, andM1, xk  t(¬αkψ). Similar to the ∗B case, we construct a
path inM2 from z to a state zk. To apply the inductive hypothesis, we observe that c(t(Pre(αi))) ≤ c(Pre(αi)) <
c(αiψ) < c(α∗Bψ) and c(t(¬αkψ)) ≤ c(¬αkψ) < c(α∗Bψ), by Proposition 4.7 and Lemmas 4.10 and 4.11. The
converse uses a parallel argument. 
5. Filtration and model shaping
5.1. Generating (Closure) function
In the completeness proof, we will fix a consistent formula in Le+Y that is provably equivalent to formula ϕ ∈ Lrf. We
will construct a characterizable Epistemic Temporal History (ETH) that satisfies ϕ, by first constructing a filtration that is an
Epistemic Temporal Model (ETM), and then modifying the model to one that is a characterizable ETH. To create a filtration,
we first define a closure function cl : Lrf → P (Lrf). We will then perform four transformations. First we will pick one state
[U] in the filtration which satisfies ϕ, and unravel the filtration with [U] as the root. A bisimulation will be established, and
hence the truth lemma for the filtration can be transferred to the unraveled model. Another transformation will be made to
trim the relation Y so that it is both a partial function bounded by the yesterday depth of the formula ϕ, which we define as
follows:
Definition 5.1 (Yesterday Depth Function). Define dep : Lrf → Z to be a function mappingLrf to non-negative integers as
follows:
1. dep( true) = dep(p) = 0
2. dep(e) = 1
3. dep(¬ϕ) = dep(Aϕ) = dep(∗Bϕ) = dep(ϕ)
4. dep(ϕ ∧ ψ) = max{dep(ϕ), dep(ψ)}
5. dep(Y¯ϕ) = dep(ϕ)+ 1
6. dep([ψ1, . . . , ψn, e]ϕ) = max{dep(ψ1), . . . , dep(ψn), dep(ϕ)}.
The next transformation will add epistemic relational connections to ensure the relation property of the update product
holds. The trimming transformation and the transformation of adding epistemic operators will not establish a bisimulation
between the old and newmodels, but it will ensure that formulas in cl(ϕ)with yesterday depth kwill be preserved at states
within k Y -relational steps from a Y -terminal state.
Definition 5.2 (Effective Negation). For any formulaϕ that is not a negation, let∼ϕ represent¬ϕ and let∼¬ϕ represent ϕ.
Definition 5.3 (Closure Function). Let cl : Lrf → P (Lrf) be defined where cl(ϕ) is the smallest set for which the following
hold.
1. ϕ ∈ cl(ϕ).
2. true ∈ cl(ϕ).
3. {AY¯ k false,A¬Y¯ k false : A ∈ A, 1 ≤ k ≤ dep(ϕ)} ⊂ cl(ϕ).
4. If p ∈ cl(ϕ) and dep(ϕ) > 0, then Y¯ p ∈ cl(ϕ).
5. If dep(ϕ) > 0, then {e,A¬e : e ∈ E, A ∈ A} ⊂ cl(ϕ).
6. If ψ ∈ cl(ϕ), then sub(ψ) ⊆ cl(ϕ).
7. If ψ ∈ cl(ϕ), and ψ is not a negation, then¬ψ ∈ cl(ϕ).
8. If Aψ ∈ cl(ϕ) and dep(ϕ) > dep(Aψ), then
{Y¯Aψ,AY¯ψ} ⊂ cl(ϕ).
9. If ∗Bψ ∈ cl(ϕ), then {A∗Bψ : A ∈ B} ⊂ cl(ϕ).
10. If α∗Bψ ∈ cl(ϕ) (α ∈ Ω), then
{t(Pre(β)), t(βψ) : α B−→∗ β} ⊂ cl(ϕ) and {Aβ∗Bψ : α B−→
∗
β, A ∈ B} ⊂ cl(ϕ).
11. If Y¯ϕ ∈ cl(ϕ), then Y¯ ∼ϕ ∈ cl(ϕ).
Lemma 5.4. Given ϕ ∈ Lrf, cl(ϕ) is a finite set of formulas inLrf that is computable from ϕ.
Proof. We show this by induction on the complexity of the formula ϕ.
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Inductive hypothesis: Suppose cl(ϕ) is finite whenever ϕ ∈ Lrf is such that c(ϕ) ≤ k.
Base case true: cl( true) = { true,¬ true}.
Base case p: cl(p) = {p,¬p}.
Base case e:
cl(e) = {e,¬e} ∪ {Y¯ true,¬Y¯ true, Y¯ false,¬Y¯ false}
∪{A¬e,¬A¬e,AY¯ false,¬A¬Y¯ false : A ∈ A},
which is finite as A is finite.
Case ¬ϕ: cl(¬ϕ) = {¬ϕ} ∪ cl(ϕ).
Case ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2: cl(ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2) = {ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2,¬(ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2)} ∪ cl(ϕ1) ∪ cl(ϕ2).
Case Y¯ϕ:
cl(Y¯ϕ) = cl(ϕ)
∪{¬Y¯ϕ,¬Y¯ ∼ϕ, Y¯ ∼ϕ,∼ϕ}
∪{AY¯ k+1 false,¬AY¯ k+1 false,A¬Y¯ k+1 false,¬A¬Y¯ k+1 false : k = dep(ϕ)}
∪{Y¯ k+1 false,¬Y¯ k+1 false, Y¯¬Y¯ k false,¬Y¯¬Y¯ k false : k = dep(ϕ)}
∪{Y¯ p,¬Y¯ p, Y¯¬p,¬Y¯¬p : p ∈ cl(ϕ)}
∪{Y¯Aψ, Y¯¬Aψ,AY¯ψ : Aψ ∈ cl(ϕ), A ∈ A}
∪{¬Y¯Aψ,¬Y¯¬Aψ,¬AY¯ψ : Aψ ∈ cl(ϕ), A ∈ A}.
Case Aϕ: cl(Aϕ) = {Aϕ,¬Aϕ} ∪ cl(ϕ)
Case ∗Bϕ: cl(∗Bϕ) = {A∗Bϕ,¬A∗Bϕ : A ∈ A} ∪ {∗Bϕ,¬∗Bϕ} ∪ cl(ϕ).
Case α∗Bϕ (α ∈ Ω): Suppose c(α∗Bϕ) = k+ 1.
cl(α∗Bϕ)
= {Aβ∗Bϕ,¬Aβ∗Bϕ, β∗Bϕ,¬β∗Bϕ : A ∈ B, α B−→
∗
β}
∪ {A∗Bϕ,¬A∗Bϕ : A ∈ A} ∪ {∗Bϕ,¬∗Bϕ} ∪ cl(ϕ)
∪
⋃
{cl(t(Pre(β))) : α B−→∗ β}.
Note that there are finitely many β for which α
B−→∗ β , the number of such β being bounded by the product of the
length of α and the size of the set E of event points in the fixed event frame. It is immediate from the definition of
t , that c(α∗Bϕ) > c(αϕ). By Lemma 4.10, for each ϕ, c(βϕ) = c(αϕ), by Lemma 4.11 c(Pre(β)) < c(βϕ), and by
Proposition 4.7, c(t(Pre(β))) < c(Pre(β)). Thus we are able to apply the inductive hypothesis.
To see that cl is a computable function, note that the cases in the inductive proof above provide a clear algorithm for
computation. To see that cl(ϕ) ⊆ Lrf, one can check that strings of event modalities are only introduced after operators
of the form ∗B and thatLrf is closed under subformulas and under the attachment of non-event modality operators. 
In completeness proof, we will need a truth lemma that asserts that states a certain yesterday distance from one particular
state must satisfy the formulas in its equivalence class that are also in a set of formulas that depends on this distance. The
sets clk(ϕ)’s in the next definition will be those sets of formulas, and dep(ϕ)− kwill be the distance.
Definition 5.5 (Functions for Layersets). For each k ≤ dep(ϕ), define clk(ϕ) = {ψ ∈ cl(ϕ) : dep(ψ) ≤ k}.
Proposition 5.6. cldep(ϕ)(ϕ) = cl(ϕ)
Proof. The rules that explicitly involve event points e or operators Y¯ in Definition 5.3 are 3, 4, 5, 8, and 11, and each of these
rules either adds formulas with yesterday depth no greater than one already in cl(ϕ) or has conditions ensuring that any
formula added to cl(ϕ) will have a yesterday depth that does not exceed that of ϕ. As for rule 10, which involves strings of
event modalities, note that whenever α
B−→∗ β , α and β only differ in the event points in each event modality, and hence α
and β contribute the same to the yesterday depth. Finally note that the translation t does not affect the yesterday depth of
a formula. 
5.2. Filtration
Definition 5.7 (Equivalence of Maximal Consistent Sets). For a formula ϕ ∈ Lrf, suppose cl(ϕ) = {ψ1, . . . , ψn}. We define,
for each maximal consistent set U of formulas in Lrf, the formula U∗ to be the conjunction ±ψi ∧ · · · ∧ ±ψn, where the
sign is determined by membership in U . We define an equivalence relation ≡ over maximal consistent sets by U ≡ V iff
U∗ = V ∗. For each maximal consistent set U , we shall denote its equivalence class by [U].
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The formula U∗ and relation ≡ both depend on ϕ, but we do not reflect this in the notation, as we will assume U∗ and ≡
to be fixed as ϕ is fixed. We define our filtration assuming that dep(ϕ) > 0. If dep(ϕ) = 0, we could use the exact same
argument as given for the proof of the completeness of DEL in [3].
Definition 5.8 (StructureMF (filtration)). We define the filtrationMF to be the tuple (SF ,→F , YF , gF , ‖ · ‖F ), defined such
that
1. SF = {[U] : U is a maximally consistent set},
2. [U] A−→F [V ] iff whenever Aψ ∈ U ∩ cl(ϕ), then also ψ ∈ V ,
3. [U]YF [V ] iff whenever Y¯ψ ∈ U ∩ cl(ϕ), then also ψ ∈ V ,
4. εF : S → E ∪ {∅} is defined by εF ([U]) = e iff e ∈ U ∩ cl(ϕ),
5. ‖p‖F = {[U] : p ∈ U ∩ cl(ϕ)}.
It is important to note that εF is a well-defined function. This fact comes from the definition of cl and the axiom uniqueness
of event points.
Proposition 5.9 (Existence Lemma for A−→F ). If U∗ ∧ ♦AV ∗ is consistent, then [U] A−→ [V ].
Proof. The proof depends on the definition of the relation in SF , rather than the exact nature of the equivalence classes. Most
of this proof is from [3]. Assume Aψ ∈ U ∩ cl(ϕ), and toward a contradiction that ψ 6∈ V . Since ψ ∈ cl(ϕ) and ¬ψ ∈ V ,
we have` V ∗ → ¬ψ . Thus,` ♦AV ∗ → ♦A¬ψ , and so` U∗ ∧♦AV ∗ → Aψ ∧♦A¬ψ . Hence U∗ ∧♦AV ∗ is inconsistent. 
We use the following definition from [3]:
Definition 5.10 (Good Path). Suppose ¬α∗Bψ ∈ Lrf. A good path inMF from [V0] for¬α∗Bψ is a path
[V0] A1−→ [V1] A2−→ · · · Ak−1−−→ [Vk−1] Ak−→ [Vk]
inMF , such that k ≥ 0, each Ai ∈ B, and a sequence
α = α0 A1−→ α1 A2−→ · · · Ak−1−−→ αk−1 Ak−→ αk
such that t(Pre(αi)) ∈ Vi, for all 0 ≤ i ≤ k, and t(¬αkψ) ∈ Vk.
Lemma 5.11. Let [α]∗Bψ ∈ cl(ϕ). If there is a good path from [V0] for ¬α∗Bψ , then¬α∗Bψ ∈ V0.
Proof. This proof is almost the same as the one in [3]. We prove this by induction on the length k of the path. If k = 0,
then t(¬αψ) ∈ V0. If ¬α∗Bψ 6∈ V0, then α∗Bψ ∈ V0. Because α∗Bψ ∈ cl(ϕ) and α∗Bψ → αψ is provable, we have
t(αψ) ∈ V0, a contradiction.
Assume the result for k, and suppose that there is a good path from [V0] for¬α∗Bψ of length k+1. Using the notation in
Definition 5.10, there is a good path of length k from [V1] for¬α1∗Bψ . By the definition of cl, we have that α1∗Bψ ∈ cl(ϕ).
By the inductive hypothesis,¬α1∗Bψ ∈ V1.
If ¬α∗Bψ 6∈ V0, then α∗Bψ ∈ V0. From the axiom epistemic mix, we have ` ∗Bψ → A∗Bψ . By modal reasoning,
we obtain ` α∗Bψ → αA∗Bψ . By Lemma 3.14, ` αAϕ ↔ (Pre(α) →
∧{Aβϕ : α A−→Ω β}). Hence we have
α∗Bψ∧Pre(α)→ Aβ∗Bψ . AsV0 is amaximal consistent set,V0 containsα∗Bψ∧t(Pre(α))→ Aα∗Bψ . ThusV0 contains
Aα∗Bψ . By the definition of cl, this formula also belongs to cl(ϕ). By the definition of
A−→F , we see that α1∗Bψ ∈ V1. This
contradicts our observation at the end of our last paragraph. 
Lemma 5.12 (Existence Lemma for Good Path). If V ∗0 ∧ ¬α∗Bψ is consistent, then there is a good path from [V0] for ¬α∗Bψ .
Proof. This proof makes use of the fact that the filtration is finite. This proof is almost the same as the one in [3]. For each β
such that α
B−→∗ β , let Sβ be the (finite) set of all [W ] ∈MF such that there is no good path from [W ] for¬β∗Bψ . We need
to see that [V0] 6∈ Sα . Suppose toward a contradiction that [V0] ∈ Sα . Let
χβ =
∨
{W ∗ : [W ] ∈ Sβ}.
Note that¬χβ is provably equivalent to∨{X∗ : [X] ∈MF and [X] 6∈ Sβ}. Since we assumed [V0] ∈ Sα , we have` V ∗0 → χα .
We first claim that for β such that α
B−→∗ β , χβ ∧ ¬βψ is inconsistent. Otherwise, there would be [W ] ∈ Sβ such that
χβ ∧¬βψ ∈ W . Note that by the extended event model partial functionality axiom Proposition 3.13 (with¬ψ instantiated
for ϕ) and both propositional andmodal logic,` ¬βψ → Pre(β). But then the one-point path [W ] is a good path from [W ]
for¬β∗Bψ . Thus [W ] 6∈ Sβ , and this is a contradiction. So indeed, χβ ∧ ¬βψ is inconsistent. Therefore, ` χβ → βψ .
We next show that for all A ∈ B and all γ such that β A−→ γ , χβ∧Pre(β)∧♦A¬χγ is inconsistent. Otherwise, there would
be [W ] ∈ Sβ with χβ , Pre(β), and ♦A¬χγ in it. Then∨{♦AX∗ : [X] 6∈ Sγ }, being equivalent to ♦A¬χγ , would belong toW . It
follows that ♦AX∗ ∈ W for some [X] 6∈ Sγ . By Proposition 5.9, [W ] A−→ [X]. Since [X] 6∈ Sγ , there is a good path from [X] for
¬γ∗Bψ . But since β A−→ γ and [W ] contains Pre(β), we also have a good path from [W ] for¬β∗Bψ . This again contradicts[W ] ∈ Sβ . As a result, for all relevant A, β , and γ , we have that ` χβ ∧ Pre(β)→ Aχγ .
By the event rule, ` χα → α∗Bψ . Now ` V ∗0 → χα . So ` V ∗0 → α∗Bψ . This contradicts the assumption with which we
began this proof. 
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Proposition 5.13 (Existence Lemma for YF ). If U∗ ∧ Ŷ V ∗ is consistent, then [U]YF [V ].
Proof. (This proof is similar to existence proof of A−→F in [3]) Suppose that it is not the case that [U]YF [V ]. Then there is a
ψ such that Y¯ψ ∈ U ∩ ∆ but ψ 6∈ V . Then ψ ∈ ∆ and ¬ψ ∈ V , and hence ` V ∗ → ¬ψ . Then ` Ŷ V ∗ → Ŷ¬ψ , and so
` U∗ ∧ Ŷ V ∗ → Y¯ψ ∧ Ŷ¬ψ . Hence U∗ ∧ Ŷ V ∗ is inconsistent. The desired result comes from the contrapositive. 
Corollary 5.14. If U∗ ∧ Ŷ true is consistent, then there exists a [V ] ∈ SF such that [U]YF [V ].
Proof. We argue using the contrapositive, and appeal to Lemma 5.13. Let us list the equivalence classes of SF by
[V1], . . . , [Vn]. The fact that [U] = [Vi] for some i does not play an important role here. The following are equivalent:
1. ` ¬(U∗ ∧ Ŷ V ∗i ) for each i
2. ` (¬U∗ ∨ Y¯¬V ∗1 ) ∧ · · · ∧ (¬U∗ ∨ Y¯¬V ∗n )
3. ` ¬U∗ ∨ (Y¯¬V ∗1 ∧ · · · ∧ Y¯¬V ∗n )
4. ` ¬U∗ ∨ Y¯¬ true
5. ` ¬(U∗ ∧ Ŷ true).
If there does not exist a [Vi] such that [U]YF [Vi], then we apply Lemma 5.13, to get condition (1) above, which states
` ¬(U∗ ∧ Ŷ V ∗i ) for each i, and hence we conclude condition (5), which states that U∗ ∧ Ŷ true is inconsistent. 
5.3. Truth lemma for filtration
Lemma 5.15 (Truth Lemma for Filtration). For each χ ∈ cl(ϕ) and equivalence class [U] ∈ SF ,
χ ∈ U iff MF , [U]  χ.
Proof. We prove this by induction on the complexity of a formula.
Inductive hypothesis: Suppose for each χ ∈ cl(ϕ) for which c(χ) ≤ k and each equivalence class [U] ∈ SF , χ ∈
U iffMF , [U]  χ.
Base case true and p: These are straightforward.
Base case e: Note that for e to be in cl(ϕ), where dep(ϕ) ≥ 1 the following are equivalent:
1. e ∈ U ∩ cl(ϕ)
2. εF ([U]) = e
3. MF , [U]  e
Case Aψ : First suppose that Aψ ∈ U . We wish to show thatMF , [U]  Aψ . Let [V ] be such that [U] A−→ [V ]. Then
by definition of
A−→, ψ ∈ V . Since ψ < Aψ , we apply the inductive hypothesis to getMF , [V ]  ψ . Conversely,
suppose MF , [U]  Aψ , and we wish to show that Aψ ∈ U . Suppose for a contradiction that ♦A¬ψ ∈ U .
We observe that ` ¬ψ ↔ ∨{W ∗ : W is a maximal consistent set and ¬ψ ∈ W }. Then we use the fact that ♦A
distributes over disjunction to see that U∗ ∧ ♦A¬ψ is logically equivalent to ∨{U∗ ∧ ♦AV ∗ : ¬ψ ∈ V }. Since
U∗ ∧ ♦A¬ψ is consistent, one of the disjuncts U∗ ∧ ♦AV ∗ must be consistent. We assumed that V was such that
¬ψ ∈ V . Then by the inductive hypothesis, we see that MF , [V ]  ¬ψ . By Proposition 5.9, [U] A−→F [V ]. We
conclude thatM, [U]  ♦A¬ψ , a contradiction.
Case ∗Bψ : This case is simpler than the case for α∗Bψ , but follows the same reasoning.
Case α∗Bψ . Let us first suppose that ¬α∗Bψ ∈ U and we wish to show that MF , [U]  ¬α∗Bψ . By Lemma 5.12,
there is a good path from [U] for ¬α∗Bψ . Let k be the length of the good path. For each i ≤ k, Pre(αi) ∈ Ui and
t(Pre(αi)) ∈ cl(ϕ), and by Proposition 4.7 and Lemmas 4.10 and 4.11, c(t(Pre(αi))) < c(α∗Bψ). Thus by the
inductive hypothesis,M,Ui  t(Pre(αi)) for each i ≤ k. Also note that t(¬αkψ) ∈ cl(ϕ), as α∗Bψ ∈ cl(ϕ). As
α 6= λ and by Proposition 4.7 and Lemma 4.10, c(t(¬αkψ)) ≤ c(¬αkψ) < c(α∗Bψ). Since the path is good,
Ui contains t(¬αkψ). Hence by the inductive hypothesis,M, [Uk]  t(¬αkψ). Our desired result follows from the
semantics. Conversely, supposeM, [Uk]  ¬α∗Bψ . By the semantics, there is a path inMwitnessing this. A similar
argument to the one used for the converse can be applied here to show that the path is good from [U] for¬α¬∗Bψ .
Then by Lemma 5.11, U contains ¬α∗Bψ .
Case Y¯ψ: (This argument is essentially the same as the argument for A.) Suppose that Y¯ψ ∈ U . We wish to show that
(MF , [U])  Y¯ψ . Suppose [V ] is such that [U]YF [V ]. Because Y¯ψ ∈ U∩cl(ϕ), we have thatψ ∈ V . By the inductive
hypothesis, (MF , [V ])  ψ . Conversely, suppose that (MF , [U])  Y¯ψ , and toward a contradiction that Ŷ¬ψ ∈ U .
Then U∗ ∩ Ŷ¬ψ is consistent. We observe that ` ¬ψ ↔ ∨{W ∗ : W is a maximal consistent set and¬ψ ∈
W }. Then we use the fact that Ŷ distributes over disjunction to see that U∗ ∧ Ŷ V ∗ is logically equivalent to∨{(U∗ ∧ Ŷ V ∗) : ¬ψ ∈ V }. Since U∗ ∧ Ŷ¬ψ is consistent, one of the disjuncts U∗ ∧ Ŷ V ∗ must be consistent.
We assumed that V was such that ¬ψ ∈ V . Then by the inductive hypothesis (MF , [V ])  ¬ψ . By Lemma 5.13,
[U]YF [V ], and thus (MF , [U])  Ŷ¬ψ . 
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5.4. Properties of the filtration
Our aim is to construct a characterizable ETM (epistemic temporal history), which was defined by Definition 4.14). The
following lemma specifies which properties of an ETH we have, and we will see that not all properties are guaranteed. The
numbering in the list of properties in the lemma that follows matches the numbers for those in Definition 4.14.
Lemma 5.16. If dep(ϕ) ≥ 1, then the filtrationMF has the following properties.
1. (Event points) εF ([U]) 6= ∅ iff there exists [V ] such that UYFV .
8. (Relation b) If [U] A−→F [V ] and εF ([U]) 6= ∅, then εF ([U]) A−→F εF ([V ]).
10. (Valuation) If [U]YF [V ], thenMF , [U]  p iffMF , [V ]  p.
Proof. The proof of these come from the definition of the closure function cl.
Event points: This condition comes from the axioms past event point mix together with the fact that event points formulas
e and Ŷ true are in cl(ϕ)whenever dep(ϕ) ≥ 1, allowing us to apply the truth lemma.
Relation b: This condition follows from the axiom restriction together with the definition of cl.
Valuation: Suppose that [U]YF [V ] and [U] ∈ ‖p‖F . Then p ∈ U ∩ cl(ϕ), and for that to happen, p must occur in ϕ. If
dep(ϕ) ≥ 1, then Y¯ p ∈ cl(ϕ), and by consistency, Y¯ p ∈ U . By the truth lemmaMF , [U]  Y¯ p, and thusMF , [V ]  p,
whence [V ] ∈ ‖p‖F .
Conversely, suppose that for every [V ] for which [U]Y [V ], [V ] ∈ ‖p‖F . Suppose also that there exists a [V ]
such that [U]YF [V ]. Then p ∈ V ∩ cl(ϕ), and henceM, [V ]  p. As this is true for every such [V ], we know that
M, [U]  Y¯ p. As long as dep(ϕ) ≥ 1, we have Y¯ p ∈ cl(ϕ) by the definition of cl. Hence by the truth lemma
Y¯ p ∈ U ∩ cl(ϕ). Similarly, we can establish that Ŷ true ∈ U ∩ cl(ϕ), and hence by consistency p ∈ U ∩ cl(ϕ) (that
is [U] ∈ ‖p‖F ). 
Thus we can only guarantee three of the ten properties that an ETM must have in order to be an ETH. What about the
other seven properties? Four of the seven do not correspond to the proof system at all. These are 3 (bounded age), 5 (states
a), 6 (states b), and 9 (relation c). The other three of the seven properties that we lack are 2 (partial functionality of Y ), 4
(synchronicity), and 7 (relation a). Note that these correspond to infinite axiom schema, where an infinite axiom scheme has
infinitely many instantiations. As cl(ϕ) is finite, the filtration can only accommodate a finite number of axioms out of an
infinite axiom scheme. In some cases, only finitely many instantiations of an infinite axiom scheme are needed. This would
be the case with past atomic permanence, which would be infinite if the set Φ of atomic propositions were infinite. Only
the axioms corresponding to proposition letters in the given consistent formula ϕ are needed. But with partial functionality
of Y , synchronicity, and relation a, finitely many instantiations does not seem to be enough to guarantee the corresponding
properties in the filtration.
We can, however, establish synchronicity up to the yesterday depth of the formula ϕ, and it turns out that wewill be able
to transform our filtration into an equivalent one (equivalent in the eyes of the formula ϕ) that is trimmed at this yesterday
depth, thus ensuring full synchronicity.
Proposition 5.17 (Bounded Synchronization). If dep(ϕ) ≥ 1 and [U] A−→ [V ], then if k ≤ dep(ϕ), [U]Y k[U ′] for some [U ′] if
and only if [V ]Y k[V ′] for some [V ′].
Proof. We assume that dep(ϕ) ≥ 1 and that [U] A−→ [V ]. Then for the first direction of the biconditional, assume that
[U]Y k[U ′]. By Definition 5.3 (items 3 and 6), ¬Y¯ k false and A¬Y¯ k false are in cl(ϕ), and asM, [U]  ¬Y¯ k false, we use the
truth lemma to get¬Y¯ k false ∈ U . By consistency,A¬Y¯ k false ∈ U . Finally, by the truth lemmaM, [U]  A¬Y¯ k false, from
which our desired result is immediate.
For the other direction, we assume that [U]Y k[U ′] for no state [U ′], and the rest of the argument is similar. 
5.5. General strategy
The general strategy for the rest of the proof is to shape the filtration into another ETM that does have all 10 desirable
properties. To establish these, we will perform the following types of transformations.
Unraveling: The first transformation will be to unravel the filtration into a bisimilar ETM that is more tree-like in structure.
A tree-like structure allows a state to be related to many different states, but no two states can be related to the
same state. This would make conditions 5 (states a) and 9 (relation c) hold vacuously, as the antecedents in these
conditions involve two states related to the same state. In order to establish decidability, we will aim for a finite
ETH at the end of all transformation. The particular unraveling we will then use will not produce a tree, where no
two states are related to the same, but will produce a model that is enough like a tree to ensure that no two states
can be related to the same state if one of the relational connections is Y . This will still ensure conditions 5 and 9
hold vacuously.
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Trimming: There are twoways in which wewill trim the unraveledmodel. One is to remove any state whose path from the
root of the (partially) tree-like unraveled structure contains no more Y -relational steps than dep(ϕ), where ϕ is
the fixed consistent formula we are finding a model for. This trimming will ensure we have conditions 3 (bounded
age) and less obviously 4 (epistemic synchronicity), butwewill lose condition 1 (event points), as theremay be states
that are not Y -related to any other state, but assigned an event point by ε. The way to resolve this will be tomodify
the ε function slightly, and have the truth lemma only apply to formulas in clk(ϕ) at states that are k Y -relational
steps from such a Y -terminal state.
The other type of trimming will be to select from every state one Y -related state to keep and remove all other
Y -related states. This will ensure condition 2 (partial functionality of Y ).
Modifying ε: This step will redefine the ε function at states that are not Y -related to any other state, such that these states
are mapped to ∅. Note that the ∅ indicates just that fact that the state mapped to it is not Y -related to any other
state. This modification will reestablish condition 1 (event points).
Expanding
A−→: The whole goal of this step is to establish condition 7 (relation a), also known as perfect recall. It asserts that
if there is a relational connection between two states (indicating uncertainty), then there was a corresponding
relational connection at the previous stage (given by the states’ Y -successors). The modification thus adds
epistemic relational connections between past states when needed. Now introducing new relational connections
may disrupt the property we established from unraveling, that guarantees that no two states are related to the
same state if one of the relational connections is a Y connection. Recall that the two conditions we were able to
obtain from this are 5 and 9. Condition 5 is vacuously true as long as no two states are Y -related to the same
state, and this remains true as we are only adding epistemic relational connections. Condition 9 states that if there
was a relational connection before, their future states will also be related to each other, unless the event points
corresponding to them indicate there was learning. Since the unraveling step, no two states are Y -related to the
same state; hence each state has a unique future. Thus for a relational connection to be introduced during this
step, there must already have been a relational connection between the corresponding future states, and hence
condition 9 will still hold as well.
Modifying ‖ · ‖: This last step is only needed if we wish to ensure that the resulting ETH is characterizable. Its entire goal is
to ensure that condition 6 (states b) holds, which asserts that the set of states at one stage that can be successfully
updated is characterizable by a formulaψ; that is, the set of states at a particular distance from a Y -terminal state
in which ψ is true are those states with a Y -predecessor. An easy way to do this that does not interfere with any
of the other properties that have already been established, is to make such formulas atomic propositions that do
not occur in the formula ϕ which we are trying to find a satisfiable ETH for. We thus need an arbitrary number
of proposition letters available. Thus completeness with respect to characterizable histories requires the set of
symbols of the language be infinite (with infinitely many atomic propositions), and completeness with respect to
histories that are not necessarily characterizable can be established for languages with finitely many symbols.
We depict this discussion in the following table. The numbers 1 through 10 correspond to the 10 properties of an ETH
(Definition 4.14).
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
filtration Y - - - - - - Y - Y
unraveling Y - - - Y - - Y Y Y
trimming - Y Y Y Y - - Y Y Y
modifying ε Y Y Y Y Y - - Y Y Y
expanding
A−→ Y Y Y Y Y - Y Y Y Y
modifying ‖ · ‖ Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Y means that the model has the property, and ‘-’ means that the property is not guaranteed.
To be more concise in the sections that follow, we will combine the step trimming with modifying ε and expanding
A−→
with modifying ‖ · ‖. It is not as easy to combine any of the unraveling, trimming, or expanding steps together, and it is
helpful to focus on them separately.
5.6. Unraveling
Unraveling is a method of transforming a model into another whose states contain a record of the relational steps taken
to get from a particular given state. Aswe have discussed in the last section, unravelingwill be key to establishing conditions
5 (states a) and 9 (relation b). The most common type of unraveling is to record every relational step of every type of relation
from a particular state, and the result of this unraveling will be a tree, which is likely to be infinite. As one of the operations
we will be performing on our model is to trim away the states that have too many Y-relational connections from the root,
we will unravel in the Y direction, but maintain the finiteness of the epistemic relational structure. Thus we will use the
following partial unraveling.
Let ϕ be our fixed formula in Lrf for which we are trying to find a model. Let [U] be an equivalence class containing ϕ,
whenceMF , [U]  ϕ. We then generate the following new set of states.
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Definition 5.18 (Set SU ). Let SU be the smallest set containing [U] that is closed under the following operations:
1. [U] ∈ SU
2. zE[W ] ∈ SU if z ∈ SU and either
(a) z = [U] and [U] A−→F [W ] for some A ∈ A.
(b) zE[V ] ∈ SU for some [V ] ∈ SF in which [V ] A−→F [W ] for some A ∈ A.
(c) z = xY[V ], with x ∈ SU and [V ] A−→F [W ] for some A ∈ A
3. zY[W ] ∈ SU if z ∈ SU and either
(a) z = [U] and [U]YF [V ]
(b) z = xE[V ], with x ∈ SU and [V ]YF [W ]
(c) z = xY[V ], with x ∈ SU and [V ]YF [W ].
Note that part 2 (b) is different from the other parts, in that it does not consider the structure of z. Considering the structure
of z would have been a natural way of defining states such as [U]E[V ]E[W ], where there is an SF state directly between
two E’s. But this would be too similar to a complete unraveling, and we wish to avoid such situations. The intention of this
definition rather is to indicate that [U]E[V ] ∈ SU only if [U] A−→
∗
F [V ] rather than [U] A−→F [V ] for some A ∈ A.
We define a function cls : SU → SF by cls([V ]) = [V ] for each [V ] ∈ SU ∩ SF , and cls(xE[V ]) = cls(xY[V ]) = [V ]. We
then generate the partial unraveling as the following structure.
Definition 5.19 (Unraveled Filtration). DefineMU = (SU ,→U , YU , εU , ‖ · ‖U) by
1. SU is defined by Definition 5.18
2. x
A−→U z iff cls(x) A−→F cls(z) and any one of the following conditions hold:
(a) x = [U] and z = [U]E[V ] for some [V ] ∈ SF
(b) x = wE[V1] and z = wE[V2]wherew ∈ SU and [V1], [V2] ∈ SF
(c) x = wY[V1] and z = xE[V2] forw ∈ SU and [V1], [V2] ∈ SF
3. xYUz iff z = xY cls(z) and cls(x)YF cls(z)
4. εU(x) = εF (cls(x))
5. x ∈ ‖p‖U iff cls(x) ∈ ‖p‖F .
We try to visualize the relational structure ofMU as follows:
[U]
Y
(··· )








E /
  Û
Y







Y
···
2
22
22
22
22
22
22
2
[V ]
Y (··· )

E /
  V̂
···Y

[W ]
Y (··· )

E /
 Ŵ
···Y

[Z]
Y (··· )

E /
  Ẑ
···Y

where for each V , V̂ is (isomorphic to) the submodel ofMF consisting of states epistemically reachable from [V ]. The E above
the arrows is suggestive of the names of the states, and each
E−→ corresponds to possibly many relational connections for
each agent. The symbol Y on a vertical branch represents one Y-relational connection. It is conceivable that there may be
an infinite string of these Y-relational connections. We have only shown strings of length two represented by two vertical
branches in series. One goal of Section 5.7 will be to ensure that such consecutive branches are no more than dep(ϕ) in
length. The dots . . . next to the Y on some vertical branches tell us that the branch need not be the last one, that there may
be many more vertical branches. Due to Proposition 5.17, each state in the submodel, say V̂ , will have at least one branch
coming out of it, assuming that dep(ϕ) is greater than the number of Y steps above it. The parenthetical dots (. . .) emphasize
the undesirable possibility that there may be more than one Y branch from the same state. Another goal of Section 5.7 will
be to eliminate such a possibility, and to ensure that the relation Y is a partial function.
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5.6.1. Truth lemma forMU
We shall use the following bisimulation to establish a truth lemma forMU .
Lemma 5.20 (Bisimulation between Filtration and Unraveled Filtration). The function cls from SU to SF defines a bisimulation
betweenMU andMF .
Proof. By definition ofMU , for each x ∈ SU and p ∈ Φ , x ∈ ‖p‖U iff cls(x) ∈ ‖p‖F . Also by definition εU(x) = εF (cls(x)).
Next, note that it is required that cls(x)
A−→F cls(z) for x A−→U z. Suppose cls(x) A−→F [W ]. If x = [U], let z = [U]E[W ]; if
x = aE[V ], let z = aE[W ]; if x = aY[V ], let z = xE[W ]. There are no other forms that x can take, and in each of these cases,
x
A−→U z and cls(z) = [W ].
Next, note that it is required that cls(x)YF cls(z) for xYUz. Suppose that cls(x)YF [W ]. Set z = xY[W ]. Then xYUz and
cls(x)YF cls(z). 
Define fml by fml(x) = V ∩ cl(ϕ), for some V ∈ cls(x) (note that we are defining fml for a fixed ϕ).
Lemma 5.21 (Truth Lemma for Unraveled Filtration). For each χ ∈ cl(ϕ) and x ∈ SU ,
χ ∈ fml(x) iff MU , x  χ.
Proof. By Lemmas 5.20 and 4.20, given any ψ ∈ Lrf and x ∈ SU ,MF , cls(x)  ψ iffMU , x  ψ . We appeal to the truth
lemma for the filtrationMF to obtain the desired result. 
5.6.2. Properties ofMU
Lemma 5.22. If dep(ϕ) ≥ 1, then the unraveled modelMU has properties 1 (event points), 8 (relation b), and 10 (valuation)
(which are the properties thatMF has) together with the following.
5. (States a) If uYz, xYz, and u 6= x, then ε(u) 6= ε(x).
9. (Relation c) If xYx′, zYz ′, x′ A−→ z ′, and ε(x) A−→ ε(z), then x A−→ z.
Proof. 1. Event points: This condition states that ε(x) 6= ∅ iff there exists a y such that xYUy. Then the following are
equivalent.
1. εU(x) 6= ∅.
2. εF (cls(x)) 6= ∅.
3. There is a [Z] such that cls(x)YF [Z].
4. There is a z such that xYUz.
The equivalence of (2) and (3) is fromLemma5.16. The equivalence of (3) and (4) is immediate by setting z = xY[Z].
5. States a: This property is vacuously true, as there can be no two states Y related to the same state. For suppose uYz and
xYz. Then by definition ofMU , z = uY cls(z) and z = xY cls(z). Hence u = x.
8. Relation b: This property states that if x
A−→U z and εU(x) 6= ∅, then εU(x) A−→F εU(z). Here we use the facts from the
definition ofMU that x
A−→U z implies cls(x) A−→F cls(z) and that εU(x) = εF (cls(x)), and the desired result then
follows from Lemma 5.16.
9. Relation c: This property is vacuously true, as no two states inMU are related to the same state, when one of the relations
is Y. Suppose that uYz and x
A−→ z. Then z = uY cls(z) from the fact that uYz. But x A−→ z requires that z = xE cls(z)
contradicting that z = uY cls(z).
10. Valuation: This property states that if xYUz, thenMU , x  iffMU , z . Then assuming that xYUz, we see by definition
that cls(x)YF cls(z), whence we can use Lemma 5.16, to obtain thatMF , cls(x)  p iffMF , cls(z)  p, which also
means that cls(x) ∈ ‖p‖F iff cls(z) ∈ ‖p‖F . Our desired result is immediate from the definition of ‖p‖U . 
5.7. Trimming the unraveled filtration
For each state x ∈ SU , we will denote by rootd(x) the number of YU -relational steps from [U] to x. More formally we have
the following.
Definition 5.23 (Root Yesterday Distance). We define the function rootd : SU → N as follows:
rootd(x) =
{0 if x = [U]
rootd(z) if x = zE[V ]
rootd(z)+ 1 if x = zY[V ].
Wewill now trim ourmodel by removing states from SU . Our aim is to bound the root yesterday distance to themodal depth
of ϕ, and also to ensure that the relation Y is a partial function.
Definition 5.24 (Set ST ). Let us define the set ST as the smallest set for which
1456 J. Sack / Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 161 (2010) 1431–1461
1. [U] ∈ ST
2. if x ∈ ST and x A−→U y, then y ∈ ST
3. if x ∈ ST , rootd(x) < dep(ϕ), and Z = {y : xYUy}, then exactly one y ∈ Z shall be in ST . The element in Z to be selected is
arbitrary.
Note that ST does not contain any state xwhere rootd(x) > dep(ϕ). Then we define a new structure as follows:
Definition 5.25 (Trimmed Unraveled Filtration). LetMT = (ST , { A−→T }, YT , εT , ‖ · ‖T ) be defined by
1. ST is defined by Definition 5.24,
2.
A−→T= ( A−→U ∩S2T ) is the restriction of A−→U to ST ,
3. YT = YU ∩ S2T is the restriction of YU to ST ,
4. εT : ST → E ∪ {∅} is defined by εT (x) =
{
εU(x) if rootd(x) < dep(ϕ)
∅ if rootd(x) = dep(ϕ),
5. ‖ · ‖T is given by ‖p‖T = ‖p‖U ∩ ST .
5.7.1. Truth lemma forMT
Define the leaf yesterday distance of a state x, written leafd(x) to be the number of YT steps from x to a terminal state.
Note that leafd(x)+ rootd(x)+K = dep(ϕ), where K is non-zero (and positive) in the event that there is no state x in SU for
which rootd(x) ≥ dep(ϕ). In such a situation where K is positive, we would have no need for the layered sets clj(ϕ) from
Definition 5.5, and the overall proof ahead can be simplified. But let us assume for the rest of the completeness proof the
harder case where K is zero.
Lemma 5.26 (Layered Truth Lemma forMT ). For each j for which 0 ≤ j ≤ dep(ϕ), each χ ∈ clj(ϕ), and each x ∈ ST , for which
leafd(x) = j,
χ ∈ fml(x) iff MT , x  χ.
Proof. We prove this by showing that for each x ∈ ST with leaf yesterday distance j, and each χ ∈ clj(ϕ),MT , x  χ iff
MU , x  χ . Our desired result follows from the truth lemma forMU . We then prove this using induction on j, and for each
j, an internal induction on the complexity of the formula.
Outer inductive hypothesis: For each k < j, if χ ∈ clk(ϕ) and x ∈ ST with leafd(x) = k, thenMT , x  χ iffMU , x  χ .
Inner inductive hypothesis: Whenever c(ψ) < c(χ), if ψ ∈ clk(ϕ) and x ∈ ST with leafd(x) = k, then MT , x  ψ iff
MU , x  ψ .
Base cases true and p: These internal induction base cases use the same reasoning regardless of the value of j. The case for
true is trivial, and the case for p comes from the fact that the function‖ · ‖ in both models treats each state in ST
the same way.
Base case e: Note that as dep(e) = 1 > 0, it is the case that e 6∈ cl0(ϕ). Thus this case only arises when j > 0, and for each
jwe use the fact that the function ε treats each x ∈ ST for which leafd(x) > 0 the same in both models.
Cases ¬ and ∧: The Boolean cases are trivial.
Case Y¯ψ: This is the one inductive step that makes use of the outer inductive hypothesis. Note that as dep(Y¯ψ) > 0, it is
the case that Y¯ψ 6∈ cl0(ϕ), and hence this case only arises when j > 0. Suppose that for Y¯ψ ∈ clj(ϕ) and x ∈ ST
with leafd(x) = j,MT , x 1 Y¯ψ . Then there exists z such that xYT z andMT , z 1 ψ . As ST ⊆ SU , we have z ∈ SU .
As Y¯ψ is in cl(ϕ), so is ψ , and as dep(Y¯ψ) ≤ j, dep(ψ) ≤ j− 1, whence ψ ∈ clj−1(ϕ). This allows us to apply the
inductive hypothesis to obtainMU , z 1 ψ . Our desired result follows from the fact that x ∈ SU and xYUz.
The converse is similar, but with an added complication. We suppose that for Y¯ψ ∈ clj(ϕ) and x ∈ ST with
leafd(x) = j, MU , x 1 Y¯ψ , and obtain a z such that xYUz and MU , z 1 ψ . We do not have a guarantee that
z ∈ ST . But recall that the truth lemma ofMU applies, whence ψ ∈ fml(x). Note that from the definition of cl,
as Y¯ψ ∈ clj(ϕ), so also ¬Y¯ψ, Y¯ ∼ψ ∈ clj(ϕ). Hence ¬Y¯ψ ∈ fml(x), and by the axiom non-branching past and
propositional logic, Y¯ ∼ψ ∈ fml(x). We apply the truth lemma again to arrive atMU , x  Y¯ ∼ψ . If z ′ is such that
xYT z ′, thenMU , z ′  ∼ψ . The inductive hypothesis applies in the same way as it did for the converse.
Cases Aψ and ∗Bψ : These steps use the fact that for each x ∈MT , {z : x A−→T z} = {z : x A−→U z}.
Case α∗Bψ : Given a state x in ST with leaf yesterday distance j (for 0 ≤ j ≤ dep(ϕ)), let us assumeMT , x 2 α∗Bψ . Then
by the semantics of ETMs (Definition 4.13), there exist sequences
x = x0 A1−→ x1 A2−→ · · · Ak−1−−→ xk−1 Ak−→ xk
and
α = α0 A1−→ α1 A2−→ · · · Ak−1−−→ αk−1 Ak−→ αk
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with each Ai ∈ B,MT , xi  t(Pre(αi)) for each i ≤ k, andMT , xk  t(¬αkψ). Note that each state in the path
has the same leaf (or root) yesterday depth. Also note that the set of formulas clj(ϕ) also contains t(Pre(αi)) for
each i, as well as t(αiψ) from the definition of cl and the fact that the yesterday depth of the formulas are at
most j. Also note that c(t(Pre(αi))) ≤ c(Pre(αi)) < c(αiψ) < c(α∗Bψ) and c(t(αiψ)) ≤ c(αiψ) < c(α∗Bψ)
by Proposition 4.7 and Lemmas 4.10 and 4.11. Thus we may use the inner inductive hypothesis for each formula
involved in the semantics of α∗Bψ to obtainMU , x 2 α∗Bψ . To attain the converse, note that the converse of each
step is true, since for each x ∈MT , {z : x A−→T z} = {z : x A−→U z}. 
5.7.2. Properties ofMT
Lemma 5.27. MT satisfies all properties of an epistemic temporal history, given by Definition 4.14, except for 6 (states b) and 7
(relation a).
Proof. Properties 1, 5, 8, 9, and 10 are preserved from the unraveled model. The trimming of the model alone could make
property 1 fail at states of leaf yesterday distance 0, but the definition of εT makes sure such Y -terminal states are mapped
to ∅, as they should. The other properties are not affected by this trimming. This is because xYUz iff there exists z ′ ∈ ST
such that xYT z ′ (and xYUz ′ as well), and for every x ∈ ST and every z ∈ SU , it is the case that x A−→T z iff x A−→U z. But now
MT also satisfies condition 2 (partial functionality of Y ), as YT has been defined to be a partial function. Property 3 (bounded
age) holds inMT , as its trimming bounds the age to be dst(ϕ). Property 4 (synchronicity) comes from Lemma 5.17 and the
bisimulation from Lemma 5.20. 
5.8. Establishing a history
We now want to establish properties 6 (states b) and 7 (relation a) of an epistemic temporal history, the only two
conditions not satisfied by MT . Recall that states b asserts that the history is characterizable, and relation a ensures that
agents do not forget permanent facts.
AsMT already satisfies both condition 1 (event points) and condition 2 (partial functionality of Y ), we can identify each
element x for which xYT z with a unique pair (z, e). The condition event points ensures that there will be such an event point
e (it is unique, as εT is a function). The condition partial functionality of Y ensures that such a z is unique.
To establish property 6 (states b), let m be the number of event points in E, the carrier set of the event frame, and let
n = dep(ϕ). We labelmn atomic propositions {qke : 1 ≤ k ≤ n, e ∈ E} not appearing in the formula ϕ. For each qke , we think
of k as indicating the leaf yesterday depth of a state. We then define sets Q ke to be the smallest subsets of ST for which the
following hold.
1. {x : leafd(x) = k, εT (x) = e} ⊆ Q ke .
2. if x ∈ Q ke and either xYT z or zYT x, then z ∈ Q ke .
Definition 5.28 (SequenceMi andMH ). Letm be the number of event points in E, and let n = dep(ϕ). We define a sequence
of epistemic temporal modelsMi = (Si,→i, Yi, εi, ‖ · ‖i) for each 0 ≤ i ≤ n. We setM0 = MT . For each i from 0 to n− 1,
we defineMi+1 to be identical toMi in every component except for the epistemic relations
A−→ and the valuation ‖ · ‖. For
each agent A, we first define,
A−→i+1 ≡ A−→i ∪{(x, z) : ∃e, f ∈ E with rootd((x, e)) = i and (x, e) A−→i (z, f )}.
We define the valuation function to be the same in each ETM other than the first (note that the definition does not depend
on i):
‖p‖i+1 =
{‖p‖T p 6= qke with e ∈ E and k = 1, . . . , n
Q ke p = qke.
We defineMH = (SH ,→H , YH , εH , ‖ · ‖H) = (Sn,→n, Yn, εn, ‖ · ‖n).
Truth lemma forMH
A key ingredient to the proof of the truth lemma is the following lemma.
Lemma 5.29. Suppose that for each x ∈ Si, and all ψ ∈ clleafd(x)(ϕ),Mi, x  ψ iff ψ ∈ cls(x), that isMi satisfies the same kind
of truth lemma asMT . Suppose also that x
A−→i+1 z. Then ifMi, x  Aψ , where Aψ ∈ clleafd(x)(ϕ), we then haveMi, z  ψ .
Proof. Suppose thatMi, x  Aψ . If x
A−→i z, then the result immediately follows from the semantics ofA. If it is not the case
that x
A−→i z, then since x A−→i+1 z, theremust be event points e, f ∈ E, such that (x, e) A−→i (z, f ). Note thatMi, (x, e)  Y¯Aψ .
By the definition of cl, we have AY¯ψ, Y¯Aψ ∈ Xleafd(x)+1. Then by the axiom epistemic past mix and our assumption that
the truth lemma applies toMi, we haveMi, (x, e)  AY¯ψ . ThusMi, z  ψ . 
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Lemma 5.30 (Layered Truth Lemma forMi). For each i, j for which 0 ≤ i, j ≤ dep(ϕ), each χ ∈ clj(ϕ), and each x ∈ Si, for
which leafd(x) = j,
χ ∈ fml(x) iff Mi, x  χ.
Proof. We show this by induction on i, the index of the ETM.We can view our base case as i = 0, which states that the truth
lemma holds forMT . Assume the truth lemma holds forMi (i < dep(ϕ)). We wish to show it holds forMi+1. We then use a
double induction on the leaf yesterday distance j of the state as the outer induction, and the complexity of formulas as the
internal induction.
Outer inductive hypothesis: For each k < j, if χ ∈ clk(ϕ) and x ∈ Si+1 with leafd(x) = k, thenMi+1, x  χ iffMi, x  χ .
Inner inductive hypothesis: Whenever c(χ) < c(ψ), if χ ∈ clk(ϕ) and x ∈ Si+1 with leafd(x) = k, thenMi+1, x  χ iff
Mi, x  χ .
Base cases true, e, p: The base case true is trivial. The case for event points e holds from the fact that the function εi is the
same for each i. Finally, the case for p holds, since for each p ∈ cl(ϕ), we have that ‖p‖i is defined the same for each
i.
Cases ¬ and ∧: The Boolean steps are easy.
Case Y¯χ : This is the only case that uses the outer induction hypothesis, and is straightforward given the fact that the Y -
relation is the same for each i.
Case Aχ : Suppose ψ = Aχ , leafd(x) = j, andMi, x  Aχ . Suppose that x A−→i+1 z. Then as ψ ∈ clj(ϕ), we have by
Lemma5.29 thatMi, z  χ . Since c(χ) < c(ψ), we can apply the inner induction hypothesis to obtainMi+1, z  χ .
As z was chosen arbitrarily,Mi+1, x  Aχ . The converse of this A case is easier to establish, and uses the fact
that
A−→i is a subset of A−→i+1.
Case ∗Bχ : Suppose thatψ = ∗Bχ , leafd(x) = j, andMi, x  ∗Bχ . AsMi satisfies the truth lemma and as for each A ∈ B, we
have thatA∗Bχ ∈ clleafd(x)(ϕ) from the definition of cl, we can apply axiom epistemicmix to obtainMi, x  A∗Bχ .
By Lemma 5.29, for all z for which x
A−→i+1 z, it is the case that Mi, x  ∗Bχ . By the truth lemma for Mi and
consistency, we have that Mi, x,  χ . Using a simple induction on path length, we establish for all z for which
x
B−→∗i+1 z thatMi, z  χ ,Mi, z  ∗Bχ , andMi, z  A∗Bχ . We can then apply the inner inductive hypothesis to
obtainMi+1, z  χ for each z such that x
B−→∗i+1 z; and henceMi+1, x  ∗Bχ . The converse ismore straightforward;
rather than applying Lemma 5.29, the definition of the semantics of ∗B can be used directly, as
A−→i is a subset of
A−→i+1 and every epistemic path inMi is an epistemic path inMi+1.
Case α∗Bχ : Suppose that ψ = α∗Bχ , leafd(x) = j, and Mi, x  α∗Bχ . As Mi satisfies the truth lemma, we have by
consistency that Mi, x  t(αχ). Similarly, as the definition of cl guarantees that for each A ∈ B and β where
α
A−→ β , Aβ∗Bχ ∈ clleafd(x)(ϕ), we can apply Proposition 3.15 so that for each such β , ifMi, x  t(Pre(α)), then
Mi, x  Aβ∗Bχ . Then assuming that Mi, x  t(Pre(α)), we can apply Lemma 5.29 so see that for every z for
which x
A−→i+1 z thatMi, z  β∗Bχ .
Using this reasoning, we can show by induction that for each pair of paths
x = x0 A1−→i+1 x1 A2−→i+1 · · · Am−1−−→i+1 xm−1 Am−→i+1 xm,
and
α0
A1−→ α2 A2−→ · · · Am−1−−→ αm−1 Am−→ αm,
where Mi, xk  t(Pre(αk)) for k ≤ m, it is the case that Mi, xm  t(αmχ). By the inner inductive hypothesis,
Mi+1, xm  t(αmχ), and hence by the definition of the semantics of ETMs,Mi+1, x  α∗Bχ .
The converse is more straightforward; rather than applying Proposition 3.15 and Lemma 5.29, the definition
of the semantics of α∗B in bothMi andMi+1 can be used directly, as
A−→i is a subset of A−→i+1 and every epistemic
path in Mi is an epistemic path in Mi+1. With paths using the same notation as above, we apply the inner
induction hypothesis to establish Mi+1, xk  t(Pre(αk)) from Mi, xk  t(Pre(αk)) and then Mi, xm  t(αmχ)
fromMi+1, xm  t(αmχ). 
Properties ofMH
Lemma 5.31. The modelMH is a characterizable epistemic temporal history.
Proof. Properties 1 (event points), 2 (partial functionality), 3 (bounded age), and 5 (states a), do not involve the epistemic
relations or the valuation, and are hence preserved fromMT .
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4. Synchronicity: This is established by an induction argument on the index i of the model. Note thatM0 =MT , for which
synchronicity holds. For every x and z for which x
A−→i+1 z, but where it is not the case that x A−→i z, there are e and
f such that (x, e)
A−→i (z, f ). By the inductive hypothesis, (x, e) and (z, f ) have the same number of Y -relational
steps to a Y -terminal state, and hence x and z will too.
6. States b: Given e ∈ E and a number k for which 1 ≤ k ≤ n = dep(ϕ) , the formula qke as defined in the definition ofMH
will satisfy the requirement in the definition of this condition.
7. Relation a: Suppose (x, e)
A−→H (z, f ). If i = rootd((x, e)), then (x, e) A−→i (z, f ), and by definition of A−→i+1, we have that
x
A−→i+1 z, whence x A−→H z.
8. Relation b: Suppose that x
A−→H z, and εH(x) = e 6= ∅ and ε(z) = f . Then leafd(x) ≥ 1, and hence e,A¬f ∈ clleafd(x)(ϕ).
If it were not the case that e
A−→ f , then by the truth lemma forMH , we would have thatMH , xA¬f , contradicting
the fact that x
A−→H f .
9. Relation c: Assume that (x, e), (z, f ) ∈ SH and x A−→H z. Our notation indicates that (x, e)Yx and (z, f )Yz. Since we have
by hypothesis that x
A−→H z, we have two distinct states related (via YH and A−→H ) to a single state. Note that
because of the unraveling, no two states are related in ST to any one state, when one of the relational connections
is Y. But the construction of SH introduces some exceptions, all of a particular kind. All such exceptions arise
from the introduction of arrows x
A−→H z. Such an arrow is added when there exist (x, e′) and (z, f ′) such that
(x, e′) A−→H (z, f ′). In our case, if e′ 6= e, then we would have distinct states (x, e) and (x, e′) Y -related (in SU , ST ,
and SH ) to the single state x, a contradiction. Hence e′ = e, and by a similar argument, f ′ = f . We thus conclude
that (x, e)
A−→H (z, f ).
10. Valuation This condition is satisfied when the model obeys atomic permanence. Most of the proposition letters are
untouched from how they were defined inMT , and hence inherit atomic permanence fromMT . At issue are the
proposition letters of the form qke , and atomic permanence is guaranteed by the definition of Q
k
e . 
Completeness
Theorem 5.32 (Weak Completeness). Givenϕ ∈ Le+Y , there is a sequential historyH and a state s ∈ H , such that s ∈ [[ϕ]](H).
Proof. Given a formula ϕ ∈ Le+Y that is consistent, there is a formula ϕt ∈ Lrf such that ϕ ≡ ϕt , and hence ϕt is consistent.
Since ϕt is a consistent formula inLrf, we can create a modelMH as done in this section for which ϕt is satisfied. This model
is, by Lemma 5.31, a characterizable epistemic temporal history.We can apply Lemmas 4.17 and 4.18 to get a characterizable
sequential historyH that satisfies ϕt . Since ϕt is satisfied inH and ϕt ≡ ϕ, we have that ϕ is also satisfied inH . 
Decidability
Theorem 5.33 (Decidability). Given ϕ ∈ Le+Y , it is decidable whether or not it is provable inLe+Y .
Proof. Given a function ϕ, translating it into a formula inLrf is computable by Proposition 4.8. The closure function cl is also
computable by Lemma 5.4, and it generates a finite set. Note that the history constructed in the proof of the completeness
theorem is finite. An upper bound to the size of the filtration can be determined from ϕ. Suppose this upper bound is b and
suppose n is the yesterday depth of ϕ. Then the size of the history will be bounded by nbn. 
6. Extending the completeness proof
In this sectionwe consider twoproof systems, and their completeness anddecidability. Recall that given an event frameF
and a setΦ of atomic propositions, the languagesLe+Y (F ,Φ) andLY (F ,Φ)were defined in Section 2.3. Now let us define
another languageLN(F ,Φ) to be the language obtained by removing fromLe+Y (F ,Φ) all formulas that have subformulas
of the form ∗Bϕ.
LetPSe+Y (F ,Φ) be the proof system forLe+Y (F ,Φ), whichwas defined in Section 3.1 and for which completeness has
been proved. Let PSN(F ,Φ) and PSY (F ,Φ) be the proof systems obtained from PSe+Y (F ,Φ) by removing any axiom
or rule that involves formulas not in respectivelyLN(F ,Φ) andLY (F ,Φ).
6.1. Without common knowledge
We first consider the proof systemPSN(F ,Φ). A proof of completeness and decidability ofPS(F ,Φ) is a simplification
of the proof for PSe+Y (F ,Φ). First the reduced form language Lrf will not have any occurrences of event modalities, and
this will reduce many steps in inductive proofs. The filtration still need not have all the properties of an epistemic temporal
history, but the unraveling can be simplified, so that the model is unraveled for all relations rather than just the relation
Y. We can then trim the model according to the epistemic depth of the given consistent formula, as well as the yesterday
depth, and this will ensure a finite model. The only step needed inPSN not used in the proof for the completeness ofPSe+Y
is the trimming of the unraveled canonical model at the epistemic depth of the given formula. Thus there is a proof of the
completeness of PSN that is cleaner and shorter, but still primarily the same as the proof of the completeness of PSe+Y .
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6.2. Without expressing event points
Completeness and decidability of PSY is discussed in [16]. That paper stated that the PSY (F ,Φ) is complete if F
contains a point that is reflexive for every agent. Herewe reflect on the proof of the completeness ofPSe+Y (F ,Φ). Although
the languageLe+Y does not involve event points, wemay still use the exact same epistemic temporal models. The definition
of the event point assignment function ε will not affect the truth of the formulas (as there there will be no event points in
the language), but an appropriate definition will be important in establishing the 10 properties of an epistemic temporal
history (Definition 4.14). So we may define ε in the filtration however we want, and redefine ε in any arbitrary way at each
step until the last. If e is an event point that is reflexive for every agent, we make sure that εH(x) = ∅ if x is not YH related
to any other state, and εH(x) = e otherwise. The event point condition becomes immediately satisfied. The fact that e was
reflexive for every agent means that the other properties (the ones regarding the update product relation) hold too.
It is in general unknownwhetherPSY (F ,Φ) is completewhenF does not have an event point reflexive for every agent.
But there is an event frame F for which PSY (F ,Φ) is incomplete, given by the following example found in [16]. Let F1
consist of exactly one event point e and empty epistemic relations, and letF2 consist of exactly one event point e, and let the
e be reflexive for every agent. We know that PSY (F1,Φ) = PSY (F2,Φ). As the proof system is complete and the formula
A false is not valid when the event frame isF2,A false is not provable. But Ŷ true→ A false is valid when the event frame
is F1.
The axiom schema in PSe+Y (F ,Φ)missing from PSY (F ,Φ) include a few that correspond to at most one event point
being associated with any state, another that relates the event point that is true to the event point that led to the state, and
finally one that restricts the epistemic relation based onwhat event points are true. It is this last axiom scheme that captures
properties that may be needed in a complete proof system forLY (F ,Φ).
7. Conclusion
This paper proves completeness and decidability of a language that adds a discrete previous-time operator and formulas
representing partial previous-events to a version of dynamic epistemic logic that includes common knowledge operators.
One aspect of this paper that distinguishes it fromother papers that add temporal operators to dynamic epistemic logic is that
this paper involves common knowledge operators. On the one hand, without the common knowledge operator, we would
be able to use the reduction technique of [9] to translate our language to one that does not involve any event modalities.
Along similar lines, replacing the common knowledge operators with the relativized common knowledge operators of [4]
might result in a proof more similar to one without any common knowledge operator, as a full reduction can be used to
convert the language to one that does not include any event modalities as is done in [4,9], though this is left for future work.
But on the other hand, the inclusion of the common knowledge operator in this paper adapts elegant techniques used in
[3] to a broader setting. For example, as the reduction technique cannot completely eliminate all event modalities in the
reduction process when common knowledge is used, the event rule, adapted from one in [3], gives us a way of dealing with
this interaction between common knowledge and event modalities by justifying our choice of static semantics over ETMs
for event modalities.
The completeness proof of this paper extends existing techniques, such as language reduction, filtration, and model
unraveling, and integrates them with further model transformations in a novel way. Characteristic of this completeness
proof is the shaping of an epistemic temporal model generated by a filtration to obey merging framework style properties
in the sense of [5,6]. This paper offers many techniques that may inspire new developments in completeness proofs in DEL
or other related logics.
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